GALPIN v. CRITCHLOW.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Saupreme Judicial Court of Afassaissetts.
IHORACE GALPIN v. ALFRED P. CRITCIILOW.
An action cannot be removed from a state court into the Circuit Court of the
United States under the Act of Congress of 1867, c. 196, after a trial on tile
merits, although such trial has resulted in a disagicement of the jury.

ACTION of contract by a citizen of New York agaiinst a citizen of
Massachusetts. After the filing of an answer, atid a trial on the
merits, which resulted in a disagreement of the jury, the plaintiff
filed a petition, affidavit and bond for the removal of the action
into the Circuit Court of the United States, under the Act of Congress of 1867, c. 196. The Superior Court ordered the action to
be removed as prayed for. The defendant appealed to this court.

C. -Delano,for the plaintiff.
-D. W1'Bond, for the defendant.
GRAY, 0.J.-We must assume it to be settled that the Act of
Congress of 1867, c. 196 (amending the Act of 1866, c. 288), is
constitutional and binding; and that it is the duty of the Superior
Court, and of this court upon exceptions or appeal, before relinquishing jurisdiction over any case, to be satisfied that a party
filing a petition and affidavit for its removal into the Circuit Court
of the United States under that act, brings himself within its provisions: Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wallace 270, and 25 Wisconsin 274; 31fahone v. Manchester and Lawrence Railroad Co.,
Essex, November 1872.
We have already decided that an action in which a trial has
been had, and a verdict rendered in the Superior Court, and exceptions taken at the trial overruled by this court, and a motion
made in the Superior Court in accordance with its rules for a new
trial on the ground of excessive damages, cannot, before a hearing
on that motion, .be removed into the Circuit Court of the United
States under the Act of 1867: Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180.
The question now presented is, whether this right of removal can
be exercised after one trial on the merits has been had in the state
court, resulting in a disagreement of the jury.
In ascertaining the true interpretation of the words "before the
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final hearing or trial" in this act, we may properly refer to the
similar Acts of Congress upon the subject of removing cases from
the state courts into the Circuit Courts of the United States, as
constituting parts of one judicial system.
When the right of removal is claimed by a defendant, under the
first Judiciary Act of the United States, upon the mere ground that
he is an alien or a citizen of another state from that in which the
suit is brought, it can be exercised only "at the time of entering
his appearance," and not afterwards, even with the consent of the
state court: U. S. St. 1789, c. 20, § 12; 1 U. S. Stat. at Large,
"
79; Gibson v. Johnson, Pet. C. C. 44.
Two acts passed by Congress during the last war with Great
Britain, " to prohibit intercourse with the enemy, and for other
purposes," and "further to provide for the collection of duties upon
imports and tonnage," enacted that any collector of the customs,
or other officer, civil or military, or other person aiding or
assisting under the provisions of either act, when sued in a state
court for anything done by virtue or under color thereof, might,
either "at the time of entering his appearance in such court," or
after final judgment therein, have the action removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for trial. But the first of those
acts expired with the war; the provisions of the second act for
such removal after final judgment were held by this court to be unconstitu.tional and void; and an Act of Congress, passed soon after
the war, for continuing that act in force after it would otherwise
have expired, limited the defendant's right of removal to "the time
of entering his appearance in such state court:" U. S. Stats. 1815,
c. 31, §§ 8, 12; c. 94, §§ 6, 8; 1816, c. 110, § 3; 1817, c. 109; 3 U.
S. Stats. at Large 198, 200, 233, 235, 315, 396 ; J1etherbee v.
Johnson, 14 M\ass. 412.
The right of removing an action pending in a state court,
between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of
different states, must be exercised by either party "before the
trial:" U. S. St. 1789, c. 20, §12; 1 U. S. Sts. at Large 80.
And a suit brought in a state court against an officer of the United
States, or other person, for or on account of any act done or right
claimed under or by color of the revenue laws of the United States,
can only be removed by the defendant "1at any time before trial:"
U. S. St. 1833, c. 57, § 8 ; 4 U. S. Sts. at Large 633 : U. S. St.
1866, c. 184, § 67; 14 U. S. Stats. at Large 171. We should
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have no d )ubt that tho~e statutes must receive the like construetion as that give1 by this court to the statutes of this Commonwealth authorizing certain actions to be removed from the Court of
Common Pleas or Superior Court to this court by consent of
parties "before the trial commences," and would' not authorize a
removal after the beginning of a trial on the merits, although that
trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury, or in a verdict which
was afterwards set aside by the court: Smith v. Castles, 1 Gray

108 ; Gen. Sts. c. 114, § 7.
The Act of Congress of 1863, c. 81, § 5, provided that if any
suit or prosecution had been or should be commenced in any state
court against any officer, civil or military, or any other person,
for any wrong (lone, or act omitted, at any time during the then
existing rebellion, by virtue or under color of the authority of the
President of the United States, or any Act of Congress, "and the
defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such
court, or, if such appearance shall have been entered before the
passage of this -act, then at the next session of the court in which
such suit or prosecution is pending, file a petition, stating the
facts and verified by affidavit, for the removal of the cause for
trial at the next Circuit Court of the United States,'. and offer
sufficient surety for filing copies of the proceedings and for his
appearance in that court, it should be so removed: 12 U. S. Sts.
at Large 756. That provision, it is to be observed, authorized
future suits to be so removed only upon petition filed at the time
of entering the defendant's appearance in the state court. It was
held to authorize suits already commenced to be removed after
verdict and before judgment in the state court, because such
actions were still "pending," within the words and meaning of the
provision: Yfodgson v. _ZJillward, 3 Grant 412, 418. At the
close of the rebellion, it was provided by the Act of Congress of
1866, c. 80, § 3, that the right of so removing such cases should be
exercised "before a ju'ry is impannelled to try the same:" 14 U.
S. Sts. at Large 46. And the further provision contained in the
Act of 1863, c. 81, § 5, and saved in the Act of 1866, c. 80, § 3,
for removing such cases for trial in the Federal court after judgment in the state court, was adjudged by the Supreme Court of the
United States to be unconstitutional: Justices v. Murray, 9
Wallace 274; McKee v. Rains, 10 Wallace 22.
This review of the previous legislation upon the subject shows
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that at the time of the passage of the Act of Congrcss of 1866,
c. 288, there was no authority for removing from a state court to a
Federal court before judgment any ease whatever in which a trial
on the merits had been commenced.
The Act of 1866, c. 288, provides that if any suit in a state
court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the
suit is brought against a citizen of another state, in which the
matter in dispute amounts to $500, exclusive of costs, is, so far as
relates to such a defendant, instituted or prosecuted for the purpose of restraining or enjoining him, or is a suit in which there
can be a final determination of the controversy, so far as it concerns him, without the presence of the other defendants as parties
in the cause, such defendant may, "at any time before the trial or
final hearing of the cause," file a petition for the removal thereof
"as against him" into the Circuit Court of the United States,
and offer sufficient surety for entering copies of the papers in that
court," and it shall thereupon be the duty of the state court to
accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause as against
the defendant so applying for its removal; " and, the copies being
entered in such court of the United States, the cause shall there
proceed in .the same manner as if brought there by original process against such defendant; and such removal shall not be deemed
to prejudice the right of the plaintiff to proceed with the suit in
the state court against the other defendants: 14 U. S. Sts. at
Large 306.
The objects of that act appear to have been to enlarge the right
of removal, which a defendant had under the Act of 1789, because
of alienage or citizenship of another state, in two respects : 1st.
That if either the suit is brought for the purpose of restraining or
enjoining him, or the controversy can be finally determined so far
as concerns him without the presence of the other defendants as
parties, he may, when the cause of action is divisible, remove the
case so far as he is concerned, leaving the plaintiff at liberty 'to
proceed with it in the state court against the other defendants:
whereas under the Act of 1789 all of the defendants against whom
relief is sought must be capable of joining and actually join in the
petition for removal: Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 180, 192, and
cases cited; F-orence Sewing Mfachine Co. v. Grover & Baker
Co., Hampshire, September 1872; Sands v.
Sewing iachi
Smith, 1 Dillon 290; s. c., 1 Abbott (U. S.) 368. 2d, That the
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right to file a petition for removal in such a case should not be
limited to the time of entering an appearance, but may be exercised "at any time before the trial or final hearing." The act, as
particularly appears by its speaking of "restraining or enjoining"
a defendant, has regard to suits in equity as well as at law.
Trial" appropriately designates a trial by the jury of an issue
which will determine the facts in an action at law; and "final hearing," in contradistinction to hearings upon interlocutory matters,
the hearing of the cause upon its merits by a judge sitting in equity. The whole effect of the change in the statute, in this respect
seems to us to have been to allow the defendant the same time to
elect whether he will remove the case int6 the Federal court, as he
has to prepare for a trial at law or hearing upon the merits in
equity in the state court, and as is allowed for the removal of a case
between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of
different states, by the Act of 1789, c. 20, § 12, or a suit for an act
done under the Revenue Laws of the United States, by the Acts
of.1883, c. 57, § 2, and 1866, c. 184, § 67, or under the authority
of the President or Congress, by the Act of 1866, c. 80, § 3; but
not to allow him, after the experiment of entering upon one such
trial or hearing in the court in which the suit is commenced, to
transfer the case to another jurisdiction.
The Act of 1867, c. 196, is entitled "An 4ct to amend the Act
of 1866," c. 288, and provides that that act shall be amended as
follows: "That when a suit is now pending or may be hereafter
brought in any state court in which there is controversy between a
citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of
another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the sum of five
hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, such citizen of another state,
whether he be plaintiff or defendant, if he will make anl file in
such state court an affidavit stating that he has reason to and does
believe that, from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able
to obtain justice in such state court, may at any time before the
final hearing or trial of the suit, file a petition in such state court
for the removal of the suit into the next Circuit Court of the Uuited
States," and offer such surety as is required "by the act to which
this act is amendatory," "and it shall be thereupon the duty of
the state court to accept the surety and proceed no further in the
suit;" and the said copies being entered in the Federal court, "the
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suit shall there proceed in the same manner as if it had been
brought there by original process: " 14 U. S. Sts. at Large 558.
This act again differs from the corresponding provision of the
Act of 1789, c. 20, as well as from the Act of 1856, c. 288, in two
particulars: 1st, The petition for removal may be filed by either
party, the plaintiff as well as the defendant who is a citizen of
another state. 2(1, It must be supported by his ;iffidavit that he
has reason to believe and does believe that from prejudice or local
influence he will not be able to obtain justice in the state court.
But the right, by whichever party claimed, must be asserted "at
any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit." These are
the very words of the Act of 1866, c. 288, and we cannot believe
that Congress, by transposing them, intended that a right of removal, depending upon a mere affidavit of the party to a condition
of things which litigants are too often prone to suspect, and conferred by this statute upon a plaintiff who has voluntarily resorted
to the state court, as well as a defendant who has been compelled
to appear therein to protect his rights, should be exercised after
once submitting the case to be decided in the state court upon its
merits, and at a later stage than any other suit is authorized to be
removed from the state to the Federal courts, except by writ of
error after judgment.
It follows that, when the plaintiff went to trial upon the merits
of this action in the Superior Court, his right to remove the case
into the Circuit Court of the United States ceased, and was not
revived by a failure of the jury to agree, nor would have been if a
verdict had been returned by them and set aside by the court.
This conclusion is supported by well-reasoned judgments in full
bench of all the highest state courts which, so far as appears by the
published reports, have had occasion to consider the question:
Akerly v. Vilas, 24 Wisc. 165 ; Home Life Insurance Co. v. Dunn,
20 Ohio State 175; Adams Express Co. v. Trego, 35 Maryland
47. The decision of Mr. Justice MILLER, of the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Johnson v. Afonell, Woolworth 390, retaining jurisdiction of an action at law so removed after one verdict
had been returned and set aside in the state court, would be entitled to great weight if this point appeared to have been there argued and considered; but it would seem from the report that it
was rather assumed, and that the attention of thdt able and learned
judge was chiefly, if not wholly, directed to other questions. The
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only decisions known to us which have distinctly affirmed a aifferent construction of the Act of Congress from that which we feel
obliged to adopt, are of district judges sitting alone, and founded
on a merely literal construction of the Act of 1867, without any
consideration of the earlier acts on the same subject: Akerly v.
Vilas, 8 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 229; Dartv. .JeKinney, 9 Blatchr.
C. C. 359.
The preponderance of authority, therefore, as well as of reason,
appears to us to be againstthe right of the plaintiff to remove this case
into the Circuit Court of the United States. As our decision is
against a right claimedunder the Constitution and Laws of the United
States, he may seek relief, if he shall be so advised, by writ of
error from the Supreme Court of the United States, whose judgment upon such.a question must control the action of all other courts.
state or national: U. S. St. 1789, c. 20, § 25; 1 U. S. Sts. at
Large 85; Kanouse v. Martin, 14 How. 23, and 15 How. 198.
Petition for removal denied.
The foregoing opinion will be found
of interest to the profession, both from
the manner in whieh the question is
dealt with, and from its great practical
importance. The mere words of the
statute, especially in the supplementary
Act of 1867, "at any time before the
final hearing or trial of the suit," are
well adapted to express the idea of allowing the removal of the action into the
Circuit Court, at ajltimes before the
'-final hearingin the state court." That
would justify the removal even after the
granting of a new trial for any cause,
either by the same court or a court of
error. And the occasion of passing the
Act of 1867, to enable the party to escape apprehended prejudice in the state
court, would seem rather to favor that
construction. The first trial might have
shown a state of feeling in the state
court in regard to the suit, justifying the
removal, and which had not been before
suspected.
The same reason which
would justify Congress in extending the
times for filing the petition for removal,
from the "1entry of an appearance " to
the time of hearing upon the merits

might equally well justify extending it
to any time before the final trial, where
more than one, for any reason, should
occur. This is certainly not an unreasonable construction of the statute of
1867. It is the one to which we should
have naturally inclined, both from the
words of the statute and the taste of the
times, as being the one expressing the
real purpose of the act. This construction renders the provision just about
such an one as the natural jealousy, en-'
gendered by our late conflict, and the
consequent asperity of feeling and want
of respect and confidence, would lead
one to expect the framer or this statute
might have had in his mind the hope t.
mend. The phra.seology of the aflidavit
required to be filed in support of the
motion or petition wonhl seem to fvior
these conjectures ; and we should not
feel much surprised to lave the national
courts take the same view of tile statute
of 1867, which the Superior Court of
Massachusetts seem to have done. This
construction seems to us entirely in
keeping with the tinkering spirit of recent legislation, both state and national.
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And we suppose it is the duty of courts contruetion, which would be improto carry out the fairly expressed pur- hable, perhaps we shall have no diffiposes of all legislation, without regard c ulty in saying that the petition tbr
to the opinion they may entertain of its r emoval must he filed bcfore any trial
upon the merits. And we suppose, that
necessity or good taste.
But we must say, that in studying the t he discharge of one jury, for any cause,
subject, and especially the opinion, ire I efore verdict and impannelling another,
cannot but commend its fairness and v'hether the same day, or the next, or
,liauity, and admire the conclusion to r iext week, or next term, is but the conwhich it cotics, as calculated to maintain t inuation of the trial of the action upon
proper respect for the spirit of the na- t he -merits to its desired result. The
tional legislation in general, and espe- trial is not completed, for any practical
ciallytowards the state courts. Theidea p urpose, until verdict. But this arguof Congress making a solemn enactment nent will not apply, where a new trial,
allowing a plaintiff, who had elected to i'or any reason, is granted. And to jusbring his action in a state court and ify the construction of the court, we
had there made the experiment of one must adopt the view before stated, that
unsuccessful trial to remove his suit into t lie petition must be filed before any trial
the national courts, upon the filing of the upon the merits. Unless this view is
prescribed affidavit, which really means maintainable, we must adopt the opposite
little more than that he feared he might alternative, that so long as tie suit refail to recover, if he took the final trial mains awaiting trial upon the merits, it
in that court, would seem to afford very may be removed, under the Act of 1867,
unusual facility to parties, and especially a purpose which we should be sorry to
to plaintiffs, to elect a new tribunal, believe, that Congress have expressed,
when the first inclined against them. It in the form of legislation.
But the decisions of the state courts,
is much the same in principle as allowing the action to be removed during the upon all questions' of this nature, are
trial. But we suppose it must be the subject to revision by the national
duty of state courts, and it surely should courts, in some form. In this case the
be the policy of the national courts, to petitioner may renew his petition in the
adopt such constructions of the Acts of Circuit Court, and that court may take
Congress as will make them most accord the action out of the state courts and
with the highest demands of justice and proceed to hear and determine it: Spragpropriety, and to escape, as far as possi- gins v. County Court of Humphries, Cooke
ble, the implication of any obvious dis- 160; Ladd v. Tudor, 3 W. & M.325 ; Ex
respect towards the state courts, whether parte Turner, 3W-ll. Jr. 258. So too
if the state court order the removal, the
north or south.
In this view, it seems to us the learned Circuit Court is not bound by it, hut may
Chief Justice, in his opinion, has pre- remand the action to the state court:
sented an ingenious and happy argument Urtetiquiv. D'Arcy, 9 Pet. U. S. 692.
This whole subject of the Federal
in favor of the conclusion to which he
comes. By treating "final hearing" as courts supervising the decisions of the
a mere synonyme for "trial," we natt- state courts, is one of vast importance
rally reach the conclusion that nothing as well as of great delicacy. And it is
more was intended by the terms 'of the the one, above all others, which deterAct of 1866, "trial or final hearing," mines the superiority of the national
than a trial upon the merits. And if the power above that of the states. It seems
mere reversal of these terms, in the Act wonderful that there should ever have
of 1867, Mas not intended to alter their been any controversy upon the point of
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the paramount nature of the national

the national courts upon these subjects.

And some of tile southern

IBut that is all now laid aside, for ever we

state courts had the sagacity to perceive
that this power in the national courts,
to measure the extent of the national
functions, and to define the mode of their
operation, as well as to limit and restrain
those of the states upon subjects comnitted to the national authority, were
entirely subversive of their ideas of state
sovereignty, and accordingly claimed for
their courts paramount authority with

trust, ann tile dangrer will now be, that
the national courts, by favoring Acts of
Congress, by little andt little, will fitnally
reduce the juri-diction of the state
courts to very inferior and insignificant
proportiotns. It is matter of satisfaction
that hitherto there has been no general
cause of complaint on this head, whatever may be thought of some exceptional
cases.
I. F. i.

authority.

Court of Alppeals of Kentucky.
LOUISVILLE, CINCINNATI AND LEXINGTON RAILROAD CO.,
APPELLANT, v. JOHN HEDGER, APELLEE.
Carriers of live-stock are not insurers. For accidents necessarily incident to the
live-stock in transportation, they are not liable.
They are bound nevertheless to extraordinary diligence, such as a prudent and
careful man would exercise in the business of stock transportation.
They cannot discharge themselves from this liability by any contract with tile
owner of the live-stock.
Common carriers may limit their liability as insurers by special agreement; but
sauch agreement cannot be implied from the publication of notices by the carrier,
unless the owner knows of such notices, and expressly assents to the limitation of
liability therein contained. (Per PRaOR, J.)
The loss or injury of live-stock in the custody or care of the carrier, is prima
facie evidence of negligence.
But when the owner takes charge of his stock during transportation, negligence
must he shown to render the carrier liable.

APPEAL from the Kenton Circuit Court.

The appellee, John Hedger, on February 8th 1872, delivered
a number of horses to the agent of the Louisville, Cincinnati and
Lexington Railroad Co., at its station known as Elliston's, on what
is called the Short Line Road, to be shipped to the city of Louisville. After the company had taken possession of the stock, in tile
attempt to drive them from the pens through a lane or chute into
the cars, one of the horses had its leg broken, causing its death.
The present action was instituted against the company for
damages. it which it is alleged that the loss sustained by the
app-llce by reason of the injury to his'horse was the result of the
VOL. XXMI.-I0
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carelessness and negligence of the company, or its employees, .-. t
in an amended petition it is alleged, "that, by reason of the careless, negligent and unskilful manner in which the chute leading
from. the defendant's stock-pens into its cars was constructed and
kept by the defendant and its agents, tle loss was sustained."
The appellant, for answer, denied all negligence, and insisted,
1st. That the common-law liability of common carriers does not
aipply to the company in its undertaking to carry live-stock. 2d.
That by a special contract made with the appellee the defendant
was not liable except for criminal neglect. - 3d. That the loss of
the horse was caused by the reckless acts of the appellee and his
agents. The law and facts were submitted to the court, and a
judgment rendered against the appellant for one hundred and
thirty dollars, the value of the horse, from which this appeal was
prosecuted.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
:PRYoR, J.-By the doctrine of the common law, common
carriers are made liable for all damages to and loss of goods during transportation, unless,' as said by Redfield, "the loss results
from the act of 6rod, which is limited to inevitable accident, or
from the public enemy-inevitale accidents are restricted to such
as come friom a force superior to all human agency either in their
production or resistance:" Redfield on Railways, 2d vol. chap.
26, p. 4. A cmmnon carrier is in effect an insurer of the goods
placed under his charge, and his responsibility begins with their
reception, and continues until they reach their place of destination,
or where lie undertakes to deliver them. This wise and salutary
rule of liability had its origin at a time when the demands of carrying freight were not very frequent, and when no such modes or
facilities for conveyance existed as railroads, steamboats, turnpikes, &c. ; and in the investigation of this case, no precedent has
been found, in any of the earlier elementary books, where the
responsibility of a common carrier is fixed, or even discussed, upon
his undertaking to carry live-stock. The reason doubtless is that
this character of freight did not then enter into, or form a part of
the business of a common carrier, or, in other words, the transportation of live-stock by such modes was unknown to the common
law. It would certainly be unreasonable to hold carriers liable for
the injuries that cattle, hogs and other live animals might inflict
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on each other when confined in one car, as is the usual mode of
carrying them. A railroad company does not undertake, unless
by special agreement, when live-stock is placed upon its cars, to
become liable in the event the stock should injure each other by
kicking, hooking or such other accidents, as no one could, even by
the exercise of the greatest diligence, prevent. In making the
carrier responsible for all such injuries to this character of freight
whilst in his charge would be imposing a degree of care and diligence that no one would undertake to exercise, and place such a
restriction upon trade with reference to the transportation of such
property as would result ia the abandonment of any such employiment. The common-law liability of a common carrier does not
apply to a case like this, and for such accidents as are necessarily
incident to live animals in their transportation upon our railroads
the carrier cannot be held responsible: Clark v. Syracuse , Rochester Railroad,4 Kernan 570; Michzqan Southern & Northern
Indiana Railroadv. MeDonagh, 21 Mich. 165.
It becomes necessary, however, in this case to determine the
liability of the company, and the degree of care and diligence
required in the carrying of live freight. In our opinion the company, when it undertakes the exercise of this public employment,
should be held to a greater degree of diligence than that required
of a mere bailee. The liability of the carrier, it is true, is greatly
lessened by relaxing the rule applicable to carrying ordinary goods
and wares, still this modification of the principle does not relieve
him from that high degree of diligence that the nature of the employment requires. In the construction of stock-pens, chutes, and
in affording the means of transportation, the company should be
held to that degree of care and diligence that a prudent and careful man would exercise in such matters. Although the stringency
of the common-law rule does not apply in a case like this, still the
character of the employment is not changed, and if live-stock
should be lost or injured whilst in the custody and care of the
company or its agents for transportation, this should be primni facie
evidence of negligence, and the burden of proof is on the carrier
to rebut this presumption. Greenleaf on Evidence, 2d vol. see.
19, says :-" That in all cases of loss by a common carrier the burden of proof is on him to show that the loss was occasioned by
the act of God, or the public enemies." The fact that the liability
is lessened in cases like this does not change this rule.
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It is maintained by the company that although it may have been
guilty of ordinary negligence in not providing a sufficient chute,
,onaccount of which the horse was injured, yet it is not liable for
the reason that an express contract was made by the company
through its agent with plaintiff's agent (the plaintiff consenting
thereto), by which the latter agreed to take charge of the stock during transportation, load and unload them with the assistance of
the employees of the company, and "will relieve the company from
responsibility for loss and damage to said stock, or for any injury
to any person from any cause except the criminal negligence of
its employees." Redfield on Railways, vol. 2, p. 80, says:-" It
would seem to be the result of the decisions everywhere that carriers may limit their common-law responsibility as insurers by
special contract." There is no good reason why such contracts
should not be deemed valid, and this court, in repeated decisions,
has recognised the right of the carrier to relieve himself from the
burden of insurer, but has never gone so far, when the question was
directly made, as to adjudge that a common carrier could by contract release himself from liability for the loss or injury to property resulting from his own negligence, or that of his employees.
In the case of the Adams Express (Company v. Nock, 2
Duvall 564, this court, in alluding to the contract affecting
merely the liability of the carrier as insurer, said: "That
analogy, principle and authority now preponderate decidedly in
favor of such contracts when fairly made without duress, imposition, &c., but no such contract will ever be implied from the mere
publication of notice, that the carrigr will exact conditions essentially variant from those prescribed by law, nor in a case of importunate necessity for immediate tran sportation and a refiusal to
carry without a special contract, should the exaction of such a contract be sanctioned." We think that this liability should not be
restricted upon the implied assent of the owner of the goods to be
presumed from the publication of notices, fixing the liability of
the carrier, but there must be evidence of an express agreement,
either by a special contract entered into by the parties, or by a
knowledge of the restriction of liability contained in a public-notice
on the part of the owner and his express assent thereto, which is
in effect a special contract: Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio State
Reports 133. If the carrier can release himself by contract
for ordinary negligence, he can also for criminal neglect, and in
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this way assume no responsibility whatever. Such a ruling would
dispense with everything like diligence and honesty in the discharge of these public duties, and be certainly destrqctive of public
interests. No one undertaking such an employment should be
allowed to contract so as to relieve himself against his own negligent act, and in determining the question of negligence, public
policy requires that he should be held to extraordinary diligence.
When the owner contracts, however, to load and unload his
stock, and to take charge of them during their transportation, as in
this case, and does in fact do so, the burden of proof when the
company is charged with negligence for the loss or injury to stock
is upon the owner, as the party who has the care of the property
is presumed to know how the injury occurred, and must himself
suffer the loss unless negligence is shown on the part of the carrier
or his employees. In this case the company attempted to show
that the appellee and his hands, by crowding the stock into the
chute against the advice of its agent, caused the injury, whilst on
the other hand the appellee introduced proof to show that it resuite1 from the defective condition of the chute.
Upon this point there was conflicting testimony, and whilst we
cannot concur with the court below, "that the company should be
held liable as insurers of the property," the judgment must be
,.ffirmed upon the issue of fact, presented by the pleadings and
proof.
The Act of the Legislature approved February 8th 1870,
authorizing the Lexington & Frankford Railroad Company, since
consolidated with this company, to contract specially for the transportation of live-stock as the parties might agree, conferred no
greater right in this regard than the company already had.
The law of common carriers is remarkably free from technical difficulties.
The insurance liability attached to them.
from the earliest recorded decisions, is
funded upon the broadest considerations of public policy; and their right
to limit that liability by express contract, while it can hardly be justified on
alstraet reasoning, has arisen from the
practical hardship of enforcing in all
eases against the carrier a responsibility
wnich neither party to the contract may
nave intended to invoke. The specil

subject of this note is the peculiar position of carriers of live-stock ; but this
topic is so entangled with the broader
question, that a brief statement will he
necessary of the existing law on the
right of the common carrier to limit his
liability as an insurer.
By a long train of decisions, beginning with Soutcote's Cse, 4 Reports
84, and extending to 1830, it was held
in England that the carrier might, by
special agieement or notice, excuse
himself from all accidents except those
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resulting from his ow., ne.l ig-ence. I a
1830 the Carriers Act (1 W n. 4. c. 68)
provided that no public notice or declaration could as such in any way affect the
carrier's liability, though special contracts could be made as at common law.
Pnder this section, The courts held that
a public notice brought home to the
other party was a special contract ; and
then, by a series of decisions extending
from 1849 to 1854, that by such notice,
or by special contract, the carrier might
exonerate himself even from the conseqeences of gross negligence. These decisions led to the Railway Traffic Act
(17 and 18 Vict. c. 31), which enacted
itt substance that no railway or canal
company should limit its liability, unless by special contract signed by the
other party, and held reasonable by the
court before whom the question was
brought. Several cases have been decided under this act, which are referred
to and commented upon in Peck v. North
Staffordshire R. R. Co., 10 1I. of I.Cases 473, by the decision in which
(the Exchequer Chamber reversing tile
Queen's Bench, and the [louse of Lords
the Exchequer Chamber) the construction of the act was finally settled.
The question obviously arises : What
conditions will be held reasonable?
Many cases will be found collected in
Browne on Carriers pp. 171, &c. When
there are alternative modes of carriage,
by one of which the carriers are insurers,
while the other, for which a lower rate
is charged, is to be at the owner's risk.
the company has been discharged ,
Simons v. G. 1'. R. R. Co, 18 C. B.
Co., I
805 ; Robinson v. G. l. R.R.
It. & I. 97, L. It. I U. P. 329. See
also McAndrew v. Electric Telegraph Co.,
17 C. B. 3, decided upon the same
grounds. But in all cases time increased
Tie
rate must not be exorbitant.
extra charge will e reasonable (1) if
the goods or live-stock carried, be especially valuable or especially liable to

injury ott the journey ; (2) if the ordi.
nary rate of the.road be charged for in-

surance by the carrier, anti a lower rate
for owners who take their own risk :
Alday v. G. iK R. R. Co., 5 B. & S.
903. Tihe alternative higher rate mut
in erery respect be reasonable : Lloyd v.
I' 4. L. R. R., 15 Ir. C. L. Rep 37.
To apply the act to live-stock" it
seems reasonable for a carrier to limit
his liability more strictly in ote respect
than for dead freight. The "proper
Tice" of animals conveyed in railway
cars, their kicking, stamping, goring
each other, or falling prostrate in the
ear in their efforts to escape, it is generally impossible for the carrier to guard
against, and therefore lie may stipulate
that injuries so caused, shall not le
within his insurance. This has been repeatedly decided in England since time
Traffic Act; see especially Blower 1.
Co., L. R. 7 C. i'.
G. W R.R.
655, decided in May 1872, and Kendal
v. L. d- G. 11'. R. t. Co., in the Law
Times for June 15th 1872. In both these
cases the owner had signed a consignment note, releasing the company. from
liability, but the decisions turned upon
the common-law liability, which, it was
decided, did not apply to injuries caused
by the proper vice of the animal. See
also the intimation in McManus v. G.
W'. R. R. Co., 2 I. & N. 693, 4 II. &
N. 327. What is proper vice, as distinguished from want of care or negligence of tite carrier, is well laid down by
WILLES, J., in Blower v. G. W. B. R.
Co. The question is often one of the
bmrden of proof. The loss or injury of
the animals in transitu is a prima facies
of negligence; this the company may
rebut by showing that all ordinary and
proper precautions were taken; the burden is then upon the owner to show
actual neglect. Whether the carrier
*may, by offering alternative conveyance
at a higher rate, contract against his
own liability for negligence, is appar-
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ently decided in the affirmative. But Loan 6- Trust Co., 21 Wise. 80, in which
the commmon law, apart from legislation the ground of decision was that stock
or agreement between the parties, transportation was a new kind of carryevidently lays down for the carrier of ing, unknown to the law when the strict
stock in England, a measure of respon- rule of liability was laid down, and was
siility less onerous than that of an in- therefore to be regarded purely as a
surer, though greater than that of a matter of contract between the parties.
mere bailee.
Ur.supported as it is, this decision caumt
In this country it is well settled that a be regarded as law. The same reaso,carrier may, by special contract, protect which induced the courts to ciifurre a
himself except for loss resulting from strict responsibility against carrier.s of
his own neglect. It was indeed at one freight, apply ill full measure to -t.k
time held in New York that the common- transportation. Negligen.c callt v, r
law liability could not be relaxed: hul- be contracted against when til oc.ulister v. Newlen, 19 Wendell 235 ; Cole pation is public, requiring a 'rnat-his.
v. Goodwin, Id. 251 ; Clark v. Faxton, from the legislature, and constituting a
21 Wend. 153; Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill Tirtual monopoly. R{ailwavs are thu
623. But these cases were overruled in great carriers of stock; and the commonDorr v. Steam a'. Co, 2 Sandford 136, law liability must attach to this species
uhnd the law assimilated to that of the of conveyance as full - as to that of
other states: see Merchants' B ank v. XV. goods or luggage. The carrier is nit
.1. Steam j'a,. Co., 6 Howard 344; insurer against all accidents except those
Penn,. R. 1. v. Ilenderson, 50 Penn. St. produced by the proper vice of the ani315 ; Farnhai v. C. &-A. R. R. Co. 55 mals, against which every reasonable
'enn. St. 23; Davidson v. Graham, 2 precaution has been taken. If there be
Ohio St. 131, qualifying Jones v. Veer- on the carrier's part any negligence
hees, 10 Ohio 145 ; Graham v. Davis, 4 concurrent with the proper vice of the
Ohio St. 362 ; IIl. Cent. R. R. Co. v. animals, he will in all cases be liable:
Adains. 42 Il1. 474; Craigv. Childress, Smith v. N. II. 4- W'. R1.1R. Co., 12 AlPeck 270, as representing an almost len 531 ; lVelsh v. 1. R. Co., supra.
unanimous eourse of decision.
This is in substance the decision in the
Nor is it questionable that carriers of principal case ; and leads to the obvious
live-stock are exempted from conse- conclusion that, as the carrier of freight
quences arising front the proper vice of may by agreement limit his liability for
tile animals : see Clarke v. Rochester and all losses not arising from his own neg• graruse R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 570; hall ligence, so may the stock carrier. In
v. Renfro, 3 Metcalf (Ky). 51 ; Snith many cases, horses and oxen in transit
v..
1I. 4- '. 1. 1. 'o., 12 Allen 531. are injured in accidents arising neither
On tie other hand, the carrier will he from their proper vice nor from the
liable, if his negligence was in atiy way carrier's neglect. Such are collisons
instrumental in bringing on the injury : with another carrier, or with a third
Sager v. P. S.4- P. 4- E. R. R. Co., 31 party, entirely the fault of the latter;
Maine 238 ; Iel.h v. P. F. It' 4- (. accidental fires, mistaking a light, atR. R. Co, 10 Ohio St. 65; Clarke v. tacks by a mob or by robbers, &c. I
R. 6- S. R. R. Co., supra; Am. Express all these circumstances the special con('o. v. Sands, 55 Penn. St. 140. One tract would probably be the determining
case only has heen found holding that the element in the case. That such contracts
carrier of live-stock can contract against should be open to the freight carrier,
his own negligence: Betts v. 1'srners' and forbidden to the carrier of live.

LOUISVILLE, &c. RAILROAD CO. v. IIEDGER.

stock, whose control over his cattle is at great speed fur many mi!es.

Exfar less than his brother bailec's over his perience has shown that under such
trunks and boxes, i ouli establi-i an circumstances they frequently become
unjust disproportion between power and wild, break loose, kick or gore each
responsibility. The authorities are clear other, or fall down and are unable
that the carrier of livc-stock may protect to rise.
It will, therefore, lie nehin-elf by arrangement with the owner, gligence in the railway company not
,..in
all liability except for negligence.
to take such precautions against these
The question remains, what will be frequent accidents as the nature of the
accountcd negligence in the carrier of cars permits. They must see that the
stock I This is rather a matter of com- cars are perfect and safely fastened, that
mon sense than of law. Negligence is the animals are securely tied, that the
a relative term, and exists or does not train does not turn a corner at such
exist according to the species of property speed as to throw them down. Ilaving
conveyed. It is negligence to omit any done so, it may -evertheless happen that
precaution, consistent with the main injury will result from the proper vice
puepose and limited powers of the car- of the live-stock, and in such case the
rier, and required by the nature of the company will not be liable. The questhing carried ; e. g., to fasten securely tion iii each case is, has the carrier
the doors of stock cars, so as to resist taken the precautions required by the
the struggles of unruly animals (Sinith
nature of the animal and consistent with
V.IV. 11. 6"N. 1. Ri. Co., supra) to use its conveyance ? Under this definition
incombustible materials for bedding numerous cases arise most difficult of
(Powell v. Penna. R. R. Co., 8 Casey decision. For instance, if a new stock
416), to remove projecting rails or sta- car can be introduced upon some lines,
ples, and generally to provide proper provided with partitions which separate
cars and means of locomotion : W'lsh v. each animal from its fellows, and thereR. R. Co., supra. It has been said that by diminish the chance of injury to him
lie is held to extraordinary diligence, to and to them, will it be negligence in any
that degree of diligence which very care- railroad company not to adopt such
fuland prudent men take of their own ani- cars? Again, in the case of collision,
inals (Du'idson v. Grahani, 2 Ohio St. not the fault of the carrier, by which
131), and is responsible for all losses animals are so frightened that they break
arising from a neglect of that high de- loose and are injured, is the carrier, in
gree of diligence; and this is true, with the absence of special agreement, liaile ?
the qualification that the precaution to be Such cases are decided in England, untken be consistent with his main duty der the Traffic Act, by the judge, in
of carriage. The size and number of this country by the jury under the direer.ilwaiycars is necessarily limited. This, tion of the court; but in all cases the
in the case of freight, which can be test is that above indicated.
.lisel.y packed, or in that of passengers,
The question frequently arises, as in
,Ise intelligence is supposed to protect the principal case, what effect has the
tiem, and it whinn concurrent negli- fact that the owner or his agent aecom:ocit'e
will excue the carrier, is usually panied the stock ? This depends upon
otit material ; but in the case of live- the degree of supervision exercised *y
stock it is very important. Horses and him oyer the animal:, for to that degree
cattle mu-t lie put side lv side into a the liability of the carrier is undutedl!y
stotk car, nmust be fristened in one posi- lessened : White Y. 11Tinnesimet (Co., 7
tion, and mu-t in that state'be carried Cush. 155.
h'le slot k may le parked
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by the owner and caret for throughout
the journey by him. This will not ecxcuse the company from providing a
sufficient number of cars or from any
defects, especially latent defects, in
their construction, or in the construction
of the pens, chutes, &c., provided at their
stations, by means of which the animals
are injured ; but it will undoubtedly meet
such cases as those in which, e..g., having
hired a certain number of cars from the

company, the plaintiff" proceeds to overload them ; 0. ,"JL R. R. v. Dmbar,20
III. 623 ; or where, the defects in the
cars being notorious or brought home to
neverthe knowledge of the plaintiff, lhe
theless hires them, though, others more
suitable were procurable: Harris v.
iorth. 1nd. Co., 20 N. Y. 232 ; Kimball
v. R. 4-B. R. R?. Co., 26 Verin. 342.
R. S. H.

Supreme Court of Errorsof Conneeticut.
MERIDEN BRITANNIA CO. v. CHARLES P)ARKER.
A manuficturing company will be protected in the use of a certain trade-mark,
though part of the trade-mark consists of a family name.
Equity will r~strain the use of the same name in so far as it forms a material
part of the trade-mark, and will necessarily injure the company, even though
another may acquire the right of that name from parties to whom it legitimately.
belongs.
It is not every use of the name, however, that will be held to necessarily infringe the trade-mark, or that will be restrained by injunction.
Though equity will not protect a trade -mark which deceives the public, it is not
every erroneous impression which may be drawn from the use of a trade-mark,
that will he sufficient to destroy its validity.
The employment of a family name as a component part of a trade-mark is no
fraud upon the public, though the family does not actually make the articles
bearing the name, provided they are the result of their skill and experience.
The complainant, a company engaged in manufacturing.plated forks and spoons,
acquired the right to the use of the trade-mark--"1847 Rogers Bros. A. 1."sabqequedntly the respondent by an arrangement with three brothers named Rogers,
manufactured plated spoons marked "C. Rogers Bros. A. 1.," Ifeld, that this
was an infringment of complainant's trade-mark, and that the use of the term
",Rogers Bros." should be restrained.

Tirs was a petition for an injunction to restrain the respondent
from the use of a certain trade-mark. The case was tried by PARK,
J., who found the facts, and the Superior Court reserved the cause
for the advice of this court.
ff. B. Harrisonand 0. H. Platt.for petitioners.
R. ngersoll, D. R. Fright and R. Iicks, for respondent.
The opinion of the court wa3 delivere'l by
CARPIxTrR, J.-The report of the committee contains an
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elaborate statement of fict-, many of which are inmater:'d ill themselves; but important only as being evidential of other faicts which
are material: there is also a reference to a large mass of documentary evidence used on the trial, all of which is simply evidence
tending to prove the material facts in controversy.
In this connection we may add that many of the questions discussed in the able and exhaustive arguments to which we listened,
are questions of fact. Of course it is not our province to decide
such questions, and ve shall not attempt to do so. We think,
however, that the essential facts are sufficiently found. They may
be stated in comparatively few words.
In 1847, three brothers, William, Asa II. and Simeon S.
Rodgers, commenced the business of manufacturing plated ware,
especially plated spoons and forks. They continued in that business until 1872, either as partners or in connection with certain
joint stock corporations, which they or some of them were instrumental in organizing; the principal of which were the " Rogers
Brothers Manufacturing Company" and "Rogers, Smith &
Company," of Hartford, and "Rogers & Brothers" of Waterbury.
The goods produced by them were of a, superior quality and
acquired a good reputation in market.
In 1862, they and said corporations, except the corporation of
Rogers & Brother, of Waterbury, had ceased to do business.
November 7th 1862, they made a contract with tile petitioners,
by which, and by subsequent contracts, the petitioners acquired
the right which they now have, to manufacture and sell plated
spoons anl forks with the name Rogers stamped thereon as a component part of a trade-mark. They also became entitled to have
and did in fact have the benefit of the skill and experience oF the
three brothers in that department of their business. They adopted
and now use as their trade-mark the words and figures "1847
Rogers Bros. A. 1," which differs some what friom the trade-mark
previously used by the Rogers Brothers, or the corporations organized by them.
The petitioners have not only preserved the reputation which tile
Rogers goods had in market, but they have materially improved
and extended that reputation so that, to some extent, they have a
valuable interest in their trade-mark in addition to the interest, i"
any, originally acquired by contract.
The Waterbury corporation still eximts, and is ,1,);-1 a laf'-g
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business. They adopted as tlieir trade-marks, which are still in
use, - Rogers & Brother A 1," and "Rogers & Bro. A. 1."
The petitioners now own "alarge majority of the stock in that
corporation, and are themselves carrying on business to some extent
in New Haven, in the name of Rogers, Smith & Company, under
the supervision of one Geo. W. Smith. Since March 1868, all tme
business done in this line by the Rogers Brothers, or any one of
them, has been for, or in connection with, the petitioners.
It was understood by wholesale dealers generally, that goods
stamped with the petitioners' said trade-mark, were manufactured
by the petitioners under the superin'tendence of Rogers Brothers;
while consumers generally understood that Rogers Brothers were
themselves the manufacturers.
Such understanding on the part of the consumers was induced
in part by said trade-mark, and in part by circulars, bill-heads,
correspondence, &c.
The petitioners adopted and used said trade-mark by the consent
of Rogers Brothers, and no person or corporation has questioned
their right so to do.
In November 1866, three brothers, another family, Ceplias B.
Rogers, Gilbert Rogers, and Wilbur F. Rogers, who were then
engaged in manufacturing coffin trimmings under the partnership
name of C. Rogers & Brothers, made an arrangement with the
respondent, whereby lie agreed to manufacture for them plated
spoons and forks, stamped C. Rogers & Bros., or 0. Rogers Bros.
The petitioners did not consent to the use of the stamps. In
March 1871, by a.further arrangement between the same parties,
the respondent was authorized also to manufacture plated spoons
and forks on his own account, bearing the stamp C. Rogers &
Brothers, or C. Rogers Brothers. The goods manufactured under
this arrangement were in fact stamped C. Rogers Bros. A 1,
until about the Ist of February 1872, since which time they have
been stamped "C. Rogers & Bros. A 1." These stamps, as the
committee expressly finds, resemble' the petitioners' trade-mark,
'- 1847, Rogers Bros. A 1," to that degree that they are calculated
to deceive and do deceive unwary purchasers, and those who buy
such goods hastily and with but little examination of the trademark, and induce such traders to believe and they do believe that
the spoons and forks sold by the respondent, bearing such stamps,
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are m-nufacturc*d ,-;the same parties that manufacture spoons and

forks bearing the stamip-i " 184T, Rogers Bros. A 1," &c., but purcla-ers who readthe entire trade-mark on the respondent's goods,
and who know the petitioners' trade-mark, cannot be deceived,
nor can they iiistake the respondent's goods for those of the
petitioners.
Large qualititie of the respondent's spoons and forks have been
sold by him upon the reputation of goods bearing such trade marks,
to wit: "Rogers Bros. A 1," " Rogers & Bros. A 1," and "1847,
Rogers Bros. A 1."
These are the principal and most important facts. There are
other facts, material to some extent, which will be noticed in their
proper connection.
Two questions arise in this case:1st, Have the petitioners a right to protection in the use of the
stamp, " 1847, Rogers Bros. A 1," as a trade-mark ?
2d, Is the respondent violating that right ?
1. The respondent contends that the petitioners are not entitled to
protection in the use of' said trade-mark, on several grounds. The
first is, that the name Iogers Brothers cannot be lawfully used by
the petitioners as a trade-mark, for the reason that long before the
petititioners commenced to stamp their goods with that name it
had been appropriated by other manufacturers for that purpose,
and it was then well known in the market as a brand for the goods
of manufacturers other than the petitioners.
It is necessary to observe that the trade-mark, in the use of
which the petitioners claim protection, is not "Rogers Brothers,"
but Rogers Bros. with the figures 1847 prefixed, and the letter
and figure A 1 annexed.
The combination constitutes the trade-mark.
The mere fact
that the name Rogers Brothers had been previously used by other
persons and corporations cannot of itself operate to prevent the
petitioners from acquiring a right to the use of the same name as a
pa'Lrt of their trade-mark.
All the corporations which had a right to use that name had
ceased to exist on the 7th day of November 1862.
The corporation of Rogers & Brother, of Waterbury, were
stamping goods Rogers & Brother A 1, and Rogers & Bros. A 1,
but sach stamps differ from that of the petitioners, and the com-
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mittee finds that the parties themselves regarded their. respective
stamps as independent trade-marks.
The reputation which attached to the Rogers goods had its ori-.
gin in the skill, taste and judgment of the three.brothers. They
had a right superior to all others to avail themselves of that reputation.
Although they had in certain instances imparted to certain corporations the right to use their name, yet in every instance that
rightwas connected with their own services and profits. Every
such corporation, except the Waterbury company, had lost or sirrendered that right by ceasing to manufacture goods.
.The right to the use of their own name, therefore, must revert
to the Rogers Brothers, or we must practically deprive them, and
iii some measure the public, of all future advantage to be derived
from their superior skill and industry.
Policy as well as the dictates of reason and justice require the
former.
The fallacy in the argument of the counsel for the respondent
seems to be this :-They assume that the petitioners' trade-mark
is identical with a trade-mark adopted and used by the several
partnerships and corporations preceding them. But it is not a
case of a continuing trade-mark used by successive partnerships
and corporations. It is rather a question relating to the right of
parties to the use of their own name as a component part of
several trade-marks used respectively by partnerships and corporations with which they are connected.
Viewed'in that light, we see no difficulty in allowing these
parties to use their own names freely, except as their right to do
so is limited by their obligations to the Waterbury company.
That corporation only acquired the right from two of the
brothers to use the name "Rogers and Brothers" and "Rogers &
Bro." That right continues, and is entitled to protection as
against the parties from whom it was acquired and others claiming under them.
But they do not complain; on the contrary the circumstances
are such that both they and the petitioners are satisfied, and we do
not see that the respondent has any cause of complaint, or right to
derive any advantage from the fact, that the trade-marks of the
two parties resemble each other.
We are satisfied, therefore, that the Messrs. Rogers bad as
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against the respondent a right to the use of their own names, and
ight, under certain legal restrictions, impart that right to the
petitioners.
It is not denied that the parties have attempted to do so, and
have in fact done so by their several contracts, so far as it may be
lawfully done.
And that brings us to the next objection interposed by the
respondent, which is that this has not been done lawfully, for the
reason that the name as used by the petitioners in their trade-mark
does not indicate the true origin of the goods, and that it untruthfully represents that the Rogers Brothers manufactured said
goods.
The principle of law underlying this objection is fully conceded,
and that is that courts of equity will not protect a trade-mark
which deceives the public. We do not suppose,. however, that the
deception need be of such a character as to work a positive injury
to purchasers, nor on the other hand that every erroneous impression which the public, or a portion of the public, may receive,
will be sufficient to destroy the validity of the trade-mark.
The question, then, is whether in this case the representation is
of such a character as to defeat the petitioners' claim to protection.
The goods manufactured by the parties under their arrangement
were manufactured under the personal superintendence of the
Messrs. Rogers, or some of them, and. were the product of their
skill, experience and judgment.
It is unnecessary to examine in detail all the evidence contained in the report tending to prove this proposition. The
proposition itself is abundantly established. The first contract
between the parties provided that the goods should be of a given
stamlard and quality; that the Messrs. Rogers should direct as to
the manner of stamping the goods; should approve the weight,
patterns, papers, boxes, labels, &c., and should devote their time
;1nd1skill to the procuring of orders for the sale of said goods;
that Simeon S. Rogers should superintend the weighing of spoons
and forks before and after plating to determine whether they contained the required quantity of silver, and should devote his tim%
labor and skill in the business of cutting down, buffing, settingpapering, boxing and labelling goods.
The contract in all these respects was complied with, and to
that'extent the goods were manufactured according to the mind
and will of the Rogers Brothers.
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It also appears that William Rogers superintended the alteration of
the petitioners' dies (of which about 1500 were in use), devised new
patterns, and to a great extent remodelled the mechanical department of the petitioners' manufactory of spoons and forks, and had
the general supervision of that department until the fill of the
year 1865. He was then absent until March 1868, when lie returned and resumed, and continued the oversight and general
superintendence of that department as before, until in the winter
of 1870-71, when he became incapable of so doing by reason of
ill-health.
Since that time his son has performed to some extent the same
duties. Asa H. and Simeon S. Rogers also have been employed
most of the time in connection with this business. Now it distinctly appears that the goods placed upon the market under the
several contracts between these parties, were not only quite up to
the standard of the Rogers goods previously sold, but in some respects were superior in quality and style. We have thus referred
to details sufficiently, perhaps, to show conclusively that the public
were in no sense defrauded by whatever representation the trademark contained, and that such representation, so far as it indicated
that Rogers Brothers were the manufacturers of the goods in
question, was in an important sense true.
All that the public or the trade cared to know, was that the
goods were the production of their skill and experience.
That fact, as it seems to us, clearly appears. The further fact
that the petitioners furnished capital and machinery, employed and
paid laborers and sold the goods, is entitled to little weight, so far
as this question is concerned, although it shows that in another;
sense the petitioners were the manufacturers of said goods.
We are satisfied that there is no such misrepresentation as the
cases contemplate, which hold that a trade-mark which states a
falsehood, is not entitled to protection. If this were not enough
to dispose of this objection, we might add that it does not clearly
oppear that the trade-mark in fict represented, or caused any one
to believe, that Rogers Brothers were the manufacturers in any
other sense than that just considered, which waz, so far as we can
judge, the same sense in which they had always been the manufacturers since 1853. Ever since then the name has been used in
various forms, and generally in such a manner as to denote a partnership, while they were in fact but stockholders in corporations.
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Now if we may sup)ose that the piuldic were fimiliar with the
history of this elterIprise, and the various chalnges enumerated ill
the report, we ,;hall have no difliculty in supposing that when the
petitioners' trade-mnark appeared, the name , denoted ihiat it had
previously, that the goods were manufietured by some company or

corporation with which Rogers Brothers were connected.
The other branch of this objection, that it (lid not indicate the
true origin of tih goods, refers mainly to the misrepresentation
already considered.
In other respects it has no particular force. Like all other
symbols and devices used as trade-intrks, its import was not at
first perhaps fully understood. The effect as well as the value of
a trade-mark, is the work of time and experience.
This probably was no exception to the rule. However this
may be, it seems to have been well understood at the date of this
petition, that goods bearing that stamp were manufactured by the
petitioners.
2. The next question is whether the respondent, by the manner
in which lie carries on his business, interferes with and injures the
business of the petitioners. On this question there is little room
for doubt or argument. Under his present arrangement lie commenced stamping goods " 0. Rogers Bros. A 1," but since February 1872 he has stamped them "C. Rogers & Bros. A 1." The
committee finds that these stamps resemble the petitioners' trademark to such a degree that they are calculated to deceive and do
deceive a class of purchasers, and that the respondent has sold
large quantities of goods upon the reputation of goods bearing the
staifp of the petitioners and of the Waterbury company. It is also
found that the respondent had full knowledge of the reputation of
the Rogers goods, and that lie supposed that the resemblance of
his own to the petitioners' stamps would enable him more readily
to sell his goods in the markets of the country. ' The fact that lie
supposed lie had a legal right to do so will exonerate him fiom any
intention to do his neighbor a legal wrong, but his" mistake as to
his legal right does not lessen the injury to the petitioners. Tile
fict that careful buyers, who scrutinize trade-marks closely, are
not deceived does not materially affect the question. It only shows
that the injury is less, not that there is no injury. Another class
of purchasers, to whom large quantities have been sold, are doceived.
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Such purchasers perhaps will have no reason to complain, as
they, if they are injured by the deception, must attribute the injury
to their own want of diligence.
But the petitioners stand on entirely different ground. No
amount of diligence on their part will guard against the injury.
An injunction is their only ade'quate remedy, and to that we think
they are entitled.
It only remains for us to consider the extent to which the remedy
should be applied. The prayer of the petition is that the respondent may be enjoined from using the stamp 0. Rogers Bros. A 1,
or any stamp of which the word Rogers or the words "Rogers
Bros." shall form the whole or a part, and from selling goods so
stamped or stamped with any stamp so nearly resembling the petitioners' stamp, " 1847, Rogers Bros. A 1," as is calculated to
deceive purchasers.
We think the petition should be granted so far as to restrain the
use of the stamp specified, and also to restrain the use of the words
"Rogers Bros."
But the use of the name Rogers ought not to be prohibited. We
cannot say thqt every use of that name will neecssarrily infringe
the petitioners' trade-mark. If it may be so used as not to infringe, it would be manirestly unjust to forbid such use by the respondent, iidasmuch as his title to the mere name is as good apparently as the petitioners'. Even if the use of the name should, in
some degree, increase the respondent's sales and thus, at lea.,t
indirectly and remotely, injure the petitioners, it is an injury to
which they must submit, unless there is such resemblance to the
petitioners' stamp as to induce purchasers to believe that they are
purchasing the petitioners' goods.
The use of a prominent name in a trade-mark will necessarily
give rise to some embarrassment of this character, and ,those so
using it must be presumed to take the risk. The respondent should
also he enjoined from selling goods bearing such stamps which were
manufactured since the service of the petitiofi, or which may hereafter he manufactured. But goods then on hand or in process of
manufacture may be sold in such a manner as to do the petitioners
no substantial injury.
At all events the circumstances of the ease are such that we are
not inclined to prohibit their sale absolutely.
The general prayer that the respondents be enjoinedfrom selling
VOL. XXII.-! I
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goods stamped with a stamp so nearly resembling the cetitioners'
stamnp that it is calculated to deceive, &c., is too vague awd uncertain to be of any practical benefit if granted.
The resemblance and deception are matters of fact to be determined in each case: Boardinanv. leriden Brit. Co., 36 Conn.
207.
We advise the Superior Court to render judgment for the petitioners to the extent indicated above.

9upreme Court of Iowa.
EMA

COGER v. NORTH WESTERN UNION PACKET COMPANY

Common carriers of passengers have the legal right to make reasonable and

proper rules and regulations for the conduct and accommodation of all persons who
travel by their conveyances.
The sale of a ticket to a passenger is a contract to carry such passenger according to their rules and regulations.
They have no right however to make rules or regulations for their passengers,

based upon any distinction as to race or color.
A negro woman who purchases a first class dinner ticket on a Mississippi steamboat is entitled to sit at the same table as the other passengers.

This is a right secured to her by the laws of the state of Iowa, and the Constitution of the United States.
The object of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States, was
to relieve citizens of African descent, from the effects of the prejudice theretofore
existing against them; and to protect them in person and property from its spirit.

Tm~s was an action at law to recover damages sustained by
plaintiff for an assault and battery committed upon her, by the
officers of a steamboat used by defendant as a common carrier in
navigating the Mississippi river, while she was a passenger thereon,
and for forcibly and with violence removing her from the dinnertable of said boat without cause and for no improper conduct on
her part.
The defence set up was, that plaintiff is a colored woman and
that there was a custom or a regulation of all boats of defendant,
well known to plaintiff, under which colored persons could not
receive state-rooms and first-class privileges and accommodations.
The other facts are stated in the opinion.
There was a trial by a jury and a verdict for plaintiff. A motion
in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, on the grounds that the
verdict was not sustained by the evidence and was in conflict with the
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law, and for alleged errors in instructions given to the jury, was
overruled and judgment was rendered upon the verdict. Defendant appealed to this court.
Howell &"Rice, for appellant.
1ccary, Hiller & AfCrary, for appellee.
BECK, C. J.-I. The plaintiff, being in the city of Keokuk, went
upon the steamer "S. S. Merril," one of defendant's line of
packets navigating the Mississippi river, for the purpose of carrying freight and passengers, to be transported to her home at the
city of Quincy, in the state of Illinois. She is a quadroon, being
partly of African descent, and was employed as the teacher of a
school for colored children in the city where she resided. She
applied at the office of the vessel for a ticket, and was given one
entitling her to transportation, but not to a state-room nor to
meals, such as those under the custom and regulations of defendant's steamers are given to colored persons. This, after its
terms were explained to her, she returned to the clerk of the boat,
and its price was refunded to her.
She claimed the right to be transported as other first-class
passengers, and offered to pay accordingly. This being refused,
she, at the time, declined to accept a ticket- on any other conditions, and left the boat. She afterwards returned, and purchased
a ticket, containing the conditions of the one she had refused to
accept, printed in red ink thereon in these words :-" The holder
of this ticket is entitled to meals at an assigned table and firstclass cot only-besides transportation." The following words,
were written across the face of the ticket :-" This does not include meals."
Before the hour of dinner, she sent the chambermaid to purchase a ticket for that meal, and one was brought her with the
words, "Colored girl," written thereon. Plaintiff applied to the
clerk at his office to be informed of the meaning of the writing,
and was told that it was a ticket of the character sold to persons
of her color, and entitled her to dinner at a table on the guards of
the-boat, and that, under the conditions of her ticket for transportation, she could be seated for meals in whatever place the clerk
saw proper to assign her. She returned the ticket to the clerk,
refusing to accept it with the conditions as explained, and its price
was repaid to her. After this she requested a gentleman to buy
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her a ticket for dinner, who bought her one, without any enlorsements or conditions. It does not appear that the officers of the
boat knew when this ticket was purchased, or for whom it was
intended.
When dinner was announced she seated herself at the ladies'
table, in the cabin, at a place designated for certain ladies travelling on the boat ; this it does not appear she knew before seating
herself. She was then informed by one of the officers of the boat
that she must leave the table, that the seat she occupied was
reserved, and that her dinner would be, in a short time, ready for
her at the place designated by the clerk. The request was for
her to leave the table, and take her meal on the guard or in the
pantry, not tb leave the reserved seat and take another. She
refused, and thereupon the captain of the boat was sent for, who
repeated the request, and, being denied compliance, he proceeded
by force to remove ler from the table and the cabin of the boat.
She resisted so that considerable violence was necessary to drag
her out of the cabin, and, in the struggle, the covering of the
table was torn off, and dishes broken, and the officer received a
slight injury.
The defendant's witnesses testify that she used abusive, threatening and coarse language during and after the struggle, but this
she denies. Certain it is, .however, that by her spirited resistanceo
and her defiant words, as well as by her pertinacity in demanding
the recognition of her rights, and in vindicating them, she has
exhibited evidence of the Anglo-Saxon blood that flows in her
veins.
While we may consider that the evidence as to her words and
conduct does not tend to establish that female delicacy and timidity
so much praised, yet it does show an energy and firmness in defenco
of her rights not altogether unworthy of admiration.

But neither

womanly delicacy nor unwomanly courage has anything to .do
with her legal rights and the remedies for their deprivation.
The-e are to be settled without regard to such personal traits of
character.
The court gave the following instructions tothe jury
"1. The defendant, as a common carrier of passengers upon
the Mississippi river, had the power and legal right to make
reasonable and proper rules and regulations for the conduct anc
accommodation of all persons who travel upon their boats.
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"2. The sale of a ticket to a passenger is a contract to carry
him or her according to the reasonable regulations and usages of
the company, and the passenger, by the purchase of the ticket, is
presumed to contract with reference to them.
"3. The right of passengers to a passage on board of a steamboat is not an unlimited right, but is subject to such reasonable
rules and regulations as the proprietors may prescribe for the due
accommodation of passengers, and for the due arrangement of
their business.
" They have the further right to consult and provide for their
own interests in the management of their boats.
"4. The duty of common carriers to carry passengers is imposed by law for the convenience of the community at large, and
hot of individuals, except so far as they are component parts of a
community, and common carriers are not required, for the accommodation of particular individuals, to incommode the community
at large.
5. The defendant, as common carrier of passengers, had the
legal right, as I have already said to you, to adopt reasonable
rules and regulations concerning the convenience, comfort, and
safety of its passengers, such, for example, as admitting to the
ladies' cabins such gentlemen only as are accompanied by ladies,
seating parties or families travelling together at the same table or
adjacent to each other, the seating of gentlemen unaccompanied
by ladies in the gentlemen's cabin, and the like.
"These and other like reasonable rules and regulations may be
adopted and enforced by the common carrier of passengers for
hire.
"But all persons unoltjeciionable in character and deportment,
who observe all reasonable rules and regulations of the common
carrier, who pay or offer to pay first-class fare, are entitled,
irrespective of race or color, to receive upon thd boats of the common carrier first-class accommodations. If the plaintiff in this
suit was unobjectionable in character and deportment, and, but for
her color and blood, was ehtitled to first-class accommodations,
and paid, or offered to pay to the proper officers of the boat, the
price charged for first-class accommodations, then I say to you,
and so charge, that the plaintiff was entitled to the same right and
privileges, while upon said boat, that other passengers upon the
same boat similarly circumstanced, of pure Anglo-Saxon origin,
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were entitled to. Arid if plaintiff's rights to first-class accommodations were denied her, simply because she has African or negro
blood in her veins, and if she, for this reason only, was forcibly
and violently removed from the table in the cabin of the boat, and
forcibly ejected therefrom, after having paid or offered to pay the
-usual and fixed price for a meal at some one of the tables in the
cabin of the boat, then the court charges you that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover in this action.
"6. If the plaintiff, upon entering the boat at the time in
question, voluntarily and knowingly purchased a passage-ticket
defining and limiting her rights as a passenger, then she was
bound by the special contract upon said ticket to the extent there
expressed. But if the contract upon this pfssage-ticket simply
related to transportation, and did not include meals, then plaintiff
was entitled to the rights and privileges of other cabin passengers
similarly situated, and of like character and deportment, except
so far as abridged and limited by the aforesaid ticket.
"7. Taking for your guide what I have already said to you concerning the right of the common carrier to adopt reasonable rules
and regulations for the comfort and convenience of passengers, if
you find that the plaintiff brought upon herself the injuries she
complains of, because of the violation of reasonable and proper
rules of the defendant, and if the officers of the boat, because of
the violation of reasonable rules and regulations of the boat by
plaintiff, and not simply because of her color, removed the plaintiff from the table when seated, and used only reasonable and
necessary force to remove her, then the defendant is not liable for
damage in this action.
"8. But the court charges you as a proposition of law, that the
rule contended for by counsel for defendant in this suit, viz., that
all persons of African descent taking passage on board defendant's boats, shall, for this cause only, submit to the rule of the
company requiring such persons to take their meals in the pantry
or on the guards of the boat, is not a reasonable, but an unreasonable
rule, and must be disregarded by you in deciding this case under
the evidence, and the law as announced to you by the court.
"9. The words upon the passage-ticket ' at an assigned table,'
cannot be construed by you in this case as giving the right to the
officers of the boat to set a table for the plaintiff in the pantry or
on the guards of the boat; and if she paid, or offered to pay, the
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usual first-class fire for a meal, she was entitled to eat it in the cabin
of the boat, upon an equality with other first class passengers of like
character and deportment, the red letters in the passage-ticket
notwithstanding."
The objectkns raised in the assignment of errors, and exclusively
relied upon in the argument of counsel, relate to the instructions
given and refused by the court. No other points are discussed
and relied upon: our attention therefore will be confined to
them.
IL It is not claimed that the doctrines pertaining to the duties
and obligations of common carriers of passengers, and the force
and effect of contracts made by them for the transportation of persons, and their right to make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations in the prosecution of their business, as announced in the
very clearly expressed and direct instructions given to the jury,
are unsound, so far as they relate to white persons. Leaving out
of view the color of a passenger, and applying these doctrines in
cases where no distinction of race exists, we do not understand
that, in such a case, counsel would object to the rules of the court's
charge. Had plaintiff been a lady of pure Caucasian blood, unobjectionable in deportment and character, and, on account of
some prejudice toward herself, her family, or the place of her residence entertained by the officers of defendant, and the passengers
they were accustomed to carry, had she been subjected to the
operations of rules established by defendant, which excluded her
from the table and cabin, and for disobedience thereto had been
treated in the manner disclosed by the evidence in this case, we do
not understand, and it would be unfair to suppose that counsel
would maintain the instructions applied to such a case, would not
be a true exposition of the law. As we regard the case, the sole
question presented for our determination is this: Had the defendant as a common carrier of passengers, the authority to establish
and enforce regulations depriving an individual of color of the
privileges and rights accorded to white persons travelling upon its
steamers, and to enforce rules whereby the former were required
to submit to treatment and accept accommodations different from
those of the latter; or, more briefly and in a word, are the rights
and privileges of persons transported by public carriers, affected
by race or color. This is the simple question presented by the
case. We understand that defendant's counsel squarely meet the

COGER v. N. W. UNION PACKET CO.

issue, and avow that carriers do possess such authority, and that
distinction, on account of race and color, may be enforced by them
in discharging their obligations toward their passengers.
III. Plaintiff's counsel insist that their client cannot be re-

garded as a colored person ; that, as white blood predominates in
her veins, she is, in law, to be regarded as belonging to the white
race, and is not therefore subject to rules or restrictions that may
be imposed upon negroes.
We do not propose to pursue the inquiry to which we are thus
directed by plaintiff's counsel, or to weigh the argument and authorities adduced by them in support of their position.' However
pertinent to such a case the discussion may have been not many
years ago in some states of the Union, in our opinion the doctrines
and authorities involved in the argument are obsolete, and have no
longer existence and authority anywhere within the jurisdiction of
the Federal Constitution, and most certainly not in Iowa. The
ground upon which we 'base this conclusion will be discovered, in
the progress of this opinion, to be the absolute equality of all men.
We will, in determining this case, accept the statement of fact
made by counsel of defendant, that plaintiff is a woman of color.
IV. In our opinion the plaintiff was entitled to the same rights and
privileges while upon defendant's boat, notwithstanding the negro
blood, be it more or less, admitted to flow in her veins, which were
possessed and exercised by white passengers.
These rights and privileges rest upon the equality of all before
the law, the very foundation principle of our government. If the
negro must submit to different treatment, to accommodations
inferior to those given to the ,hite man, when transported by
public carriers, he is deprived of the benefits of this very principle
of equality. His contract with a carrier would not secure him the
same privileges and the same rights that a like contract made with
the same party by his white fellow-citizen would bestow upon the
latter.
If he buys merchandise of the tradesman or corn of the farmer,
io principle of equality or justice will permit him to be supplied
with an inferior article, or short weight or measure, because of
his dark complexion. Why can it be claimed that his ticket for
On thig point which is now more mtter of curiosity than of practical importance, bee People v. Dean, 5 Am. Law Rt'v.

X. S. 721.-ED.

COGER v. N. W. UNION PACKET CO.

transportation upon a steamboat may assign him to a cot for sleep
or a place upon the guards for his dinner ?
It may be claimed that as he does not get accommodations equal
to the whiite man he is not charged as great a price.
But this does not modify the injustice and tyranny of the rule
contended for.
It amounts to a denial of equality. It says to the negro, you
may have inferior accommodations at a reduced price, but no
others. Who could defend the rule when carried to its legitimate
end ? Under it the colored man could be forbidden to.buy merchandise or corn, except of an inferior quality, and the oppression
and injustice would be justified on the ground that lie is not
charged the price of good articles of the same class. The absurdity and gross injustice of the rule-nay, its positive wickedness,
like all other principles intended to inflict oppression and wrong,
are readily exposed by tracing it to its natural consequences. The
doctrines of natural law and of Christianity forbid that rights be
denied on the ground of race or color, and this principle has become
incorporated into the paramount law of the Union. It has been
recognised by this court in a decision wherein it is held that the
directors of a public school could not forbid a colored child to
attend a school of white children simply on the ground of negro
parentage, although the directors provided competent instruction
for her at a school composed exclusively of colored children: Clark
* v. The Board of Directors, J.c., 24 Iowa 267.
STie decision is planted on the broad and just ground of' equality
of all men before the law, which is not limited by color, nationality,
religion or condition in life. This principle of equality is announced and secured by the very first words of our state Constitution, which relate to the rights of the people, in language most
comprehensive and incapable of misconstruction, namely: "All
men are, by nature, free and equal;" Art. 1, § 1. Upon it we
rest our conclusion in this case.
V. But the doctrine of equality and its application to the rights
of the plaintiff, as presented in the record before us, depends for
support not alone upon the Constitution of this state and adjudication of this court. They are recogniscd and secured by the recent
constitutional amendments and legislation of the United States.
The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution is in these words:"All per.ons born or naturalized in the United States and sub-
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ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; Nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
its laws."
Attention is briefly demanded to the nature of the rights secured
and the character of the persons contemplated by this provision.
The rights are: 1. Those of citizenship of the United States
and of the states; 2. Protection of privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States against abridgment by the states.
The term privileges is comprehensive, and includes all rights pertaining to the person as a citizen of the United States. For a discussion of the import of the word see Mr. Justice MILLEr'S opinion
in the AS'lauglter House Cases, 16 Wallace 36, and the cases
therein cited ; 3. Security of life, liberty and property, and equal
protection of state laws.
The persons contemplated by the amendment are:
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof. These are secured the
right of citizenship of the United States and protected against
abridgment of their privileges and immunities. 2. Al persons
within the jurisdiction of the state. These are protected in
life, liberty and property, and secured the equal protection of
the laws. Plhiintiff belongs to both classes of persons to whom
rights are secured and protection extended by the amendment
under consideration. The Act of Congress of April 9th 1866
(The Civil Rights Bill) provides " That persons born in the
United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States ; and such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except for the punishment of crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right in every state and
territory in the United States to make and enforc e contracts, to
sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
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like punishments, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordiiance, regulation or custom" to the contrary notwithstanding." Under this statute equality in rights is secured to the
negro.
The language is comprehensive, and includes the rights to
property and all rights growing out of contracts. It does include
within its broad terms every right arising in the affairs of life.
The right of the passenger under the contract of transportation
The colored man is guaranwith the carrier is included therein.
teed equality and equal protection of the laws with his white neighbor. These are the rights secured to him as a citizen of the United States, without regard to his color, and constitute his privileges
which are secured by the constitutional amendment above considered. The peculiar privilege of the colored man, intended to be
guaranteed by these constitutional and statutory provisions, is
equality with the white man in all the affairs of life over which
there may be legislation, or of which the courts may take cognisance. Ile is secured in life, liberty and property, and the remedies provided by law to enforce the rights pertaining thereto. As
to all these, there cannot be laws imposing disabilities upon him
or depriving him of equal benefits, equal advantages and equal
protection with other citizens. Other views of these statutory and
constitutional provisions could be stated, strengthening the conclusion we have expressed. But we deem it unnecessary further to
discuss the subject, our minds resting with confidence upon the
views we have announced.
VI. It is insisted that the rights claimed by plaintiff, for the
deprivation of which she prosecutes this suit, are social, and are
not therefore secured by the constitution and statutes, either of the
state or of the United States. Without doubting that social rights
and privileges are not within the protection of the laws and constitutional provisions in question, we are satisfied that the rights
and privileges which were denied plaintiff are not within that
class. She was refused accommodations equal to those enjoyed
by white passengers. She offered to pay the fare required of
those iiho had the best accommodations the boat offered. She
was unobjectionable in deportment and character. The advantages of the contract made with other passengers were denied
her. lIer money would not purchase for her that which the same
sum would entitle a white passenger to receive.
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In these matters her rights of property were involved, and her
right to demand services; to which she was lawfully entitled, was
denied.
She complains, not because she was deprived of the society of
white persons. Certainly no one will claim that the passengers in
the cabin of a steamboat are there in the character of members of
what is called society. Their companionship as travellers is not
esteemed by any class of our people to create social relations.
Neither are these created by the seat at a common table. Those
of high pretensions in society, and the good and virtuous, may
mingle as passengers in the cabin, and sit at the same table with
the lowly and vicious, without a thought that .the social barriers
erected by the haughty assumptions of pride and wealth, or the
just requirements of morals and good manners, are broken down,
and the high and low, good and bad, are thus brought to a common level of conventional society. The plaintiff could not have
attained any social standing by being permitted to share the treatment awarded to other passengers; she claimed no social privilege,
but substantial privileges pertaining to her property and the
protection of her person.
It cannot be doubted that she was excluded from the table and
cabin, not because others would have been degraded and she
elevated in society, but because of prejudice entertained against
her race, growing out of its former condition of servitude, a
prejudice, be it proclaimed to the honor of our people, that is fast
giving way to nobler sentiments, and, it is hoped, will soon be
entombed with its parent, slavery. The object of the amendments
of the Federal constitution and of the statutes above referred to
was to relieve citizens of the black race from the effects of this
prejudice, to protect them in person and property from its spirit.
We are disposed to construe these laws according to their very
spirit and intent, so that equal rights and equal protection shall be
secured to all, regardless of color or nationality.
The instructions. above quoted announce the doctrine of equality
without regard to color; that plaintiff could, by no regulation or
custom of defendants' boats, be depri-ed of any right to accommodations to which she would be ent'ied under such customs, but
for her color. In this they corrr tly state the law. Those asked
by defendants expressed a -'dfferent rule, and were properly
refused.
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VII. Defendants' counsel insist that, under the contract expressed by the ticket for transportation purchased by plaintiff, she
had no right to a seat at any other than an "assigned table," and
that when she seated herself at the ladies' table in the cabin, it was
in violation of this contract, and she was therefore lawfully remnoved by the master of the boat.
We will not stop to inquire whether a contract with a common
carrier or others exercising public employment, exacted by them
to enforce customs in derogation of the equality of the colored
race, or any other class of citizens, may be enforced against those
whose rights and privileges are intended to be thereby abridged.
We are well satisfied that a common carrier cannot refuse to transport all persons without distinctions based upon color or nationality, and that they cannot require contracts of the character indicated, to be accepted by those demanding transportation.
Whether such contracts, when knowingly and voluntarily made,
are binding upon the party affected thereby, is not made a question in this case. By the sixth instruction, the District Court
recognised their validity when entered into in the manner indicated.
But he court correctly considered, as appears by the ninth instruction, that the conditions of the ticket for transportation had
no relation to plaintiff's right to a seat at the table, but pertained
exclusively to transportation.
Her dinner-ticket gave her a right to dine in the cabin on an
equality with other passengers. This view disposes of objections
made to the ninth instruction, on the ground that it conflicts with
the sixth, as well as certain points made by counsel, supporting
the right of the officers of the boat to remove plaintiff from the
cabin, under the contract expressed in the transportation-ticket.
VIII. It is urged that the plaintiff was rightfully removed from
the table because she occupied a seat reserved for other passengers.
The instructions given to the jury fairly announce the right or the
officers of the boat to enforce reasonable rules, and those reserving
seats for ladies travelling without escort, may be included in the
number. For disobedience thereof, or for other proper reasons,
it may be admitted she could have been properly removed from
such reserved seat. But the instructions rightly hold she could
not have been lawfully removed from the seat she occupied on acconnt of her color. The cause of her removal was thus properly
left to the jury, and there is no reason to doubt the correctness of
the conclusion they reached upon this question of fact.
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IX. It is also insisted that the treatment she received was justified by her bad language and improper behavior. The law, as to
the authority of defendant and its officers to enforce rules requiring
proper deportment, is sufficiently stated in the instructions. Whether her treatment resulted from the enforcement of such rules or
of others aimed at her exclusion on account of color, were questions
for the jury and were left to them by the instructions. There is

no just ground of complaint with their findings thereon.
X. Certain instructions were asked by defendant and refused, to

the effect that the dinner-ticket having been procured by plaintiff
through deception and without the knowledge of the officers of the
boat, entitled her to no rights -other than those given by the transportation-ticket. It does not appear that the rules and custom of
the boat required tickets to be purchased in person by the individuals using them, or that a ticket not thus obtained conferred no

rights upon the party acquiring it.

Having obtained the ticket in

a manner not forbidden by the regulations of the boat or by law,
she was entitled thereby to all the rights which it would have conferred upon a white person if obtained in the same way.
The foregoing discussion disposes of all !the objections made by
defendants' counsel to the rulings of the District Court. In our
opinion they are correct; the judgment is therefore affirmed.

Court of Errors and Appeals of Delaware.
PHILADELPHIA,

WILMINGTON AND BALTIMORE
COMPANY v. BOWER.

RAILROAD

It is settled law that charters of corporations, other than municipal, although
the objects of the corporation may be quasi public, are contracts within the protection of the Federal constitution.
Any act having the effect to abridge or restrict any power or privilege vested
by the charter, which is material to the beneficial exercise of the franchise granted,
and which must be supposed to have entered into the consideration for the acceptance of the charter by the corporators, is an impairing of the obligation of the
contract within the prohibition of the Constitution.
An act prohibiting a railroad company '-om charging at a greater rate per
mile for carriage of passengers or freight f m place to place within a state, than
for similar carriage through or beyond t . state, no such power to regulate charges
having been reserved in the charter, i' anconstitutional and void.
Such an act is not within the police power of the state. The legislature may
regulate the exercise of the corporate franchise by general laws passed in good
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faith for the legitimate ends of the police power, that is for the peace, good order,
health, comfort and welfare of society, bat it cannot under color of such laws destroy or impair the franchise itself, nor any of those rights or powers which are essential to its beneficial exercise.

TIis was an action at law by the appellee Bowers, to recover
the sum of $56.80 as a penalty for overcharge by the appellant,
for carrying freight from Newport to Wilmington, two places within
the state of Delaware, at a greater rate per mile than the appellant had charged for similar services between Port Deposit in
Maryland, and Wilmington in Delaware.
An Act of the General Assembly of Delaware, pas.-e 1 April
11th 1873, is in these words:I- SEc'r. 4. That if the said Philadelphia, Wilhington and Baltimore
Railroad Company, or any other railroad company in this state, shall,
either as the operator of its own railroad or railroads, or as lessee
of other railroads within the state, charge and receive a greater
rate per mile for the carriage of passengers (except so far
as the same may be increased to the amount of the tax annually
paid under the provisions of Chapter 458, Volume 12 of the Laws
of Delaware) or for the carriage or transportation of goods, wares
or merchandise or other property whatsoever, frotm place to place
within the state, or from a place within the state to a place without the
state, than is charged by such company for the carriage of passengers
and the transportation of property or freight for like distances, or per
mile, friom places without the state to places within the state, or from
places within the state through the state to other places without the
state, the person or persons paying such charges, either as fare or freight,
shall be entitled to recover from such company so charging anl receiving
the same, a suni of ten-fold the amount of the money so paid, to be recovered inan action of debt or assumisit, as like amounts arc now recovered by law."
The plaintiff recovered in the court below, subject to questions
reserved for the opinion of this court.
Geo. I.
below.

Bates and Lore, Attorney-General, for the plaintiff

Jos. P. Conegys and Geo. 0. Gordon, for the appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BATES, Chancellor.-Several objections to this statute were
made at the bar. The objection which in the judgment of the couri
is decisive, antI upon which alone its opinion will be given, is that
which treats time act as within the clause of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that no state shall pass any "law
impairing the obligation of contracts."-Art I., see. 10.
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A wide range of argument was taken, but among all the q.uestions discussed two only are material. These are, (1) Is the
charter of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad
Company a contract in the sense of the constitutional prorision ?
and (2) If, it be such, then does the act impair its obligation ?
Both these questions are answered by rules for the construction
of this provision of the Constitution long since established by the
Supreme Court of the United States-the tribunal which is the
ultimate and only authoritative expounder of the Federal Constitution.
In the first place, then, since the decision of the celebrated
Dartmouth college Case, in 1819, 4 Wheat. 518, it has ceased to
be a point for discussion that a corporate charter is a contraut
within the prohibitory clause referred to; and further, that a
charter is none the less protected against legislative interference,
although the franchise granted be one in the exercise of which the
public are interested, if, nevertheless, the corporation itself be a
private one. For, the uses of a corporation may in a certain
sense be public, and yet the corporation, with its franchises and
property, be private,-as much so as if such franchises and
property-were vested in a single person instead of in a company;
and nothing can be clearer than that franchises and property
which in their nature are private must ibe equally inviolate
whether vested in a corporation or in an individual. To this
class of private corporationsfor public uses belong a large number,
such as colleges, banks, insurance, turnpike companies, &c. A
broadly marked distinction is taken in the Dartmouth coleqe
Case between these quasi-public corporations and those of a. more
limited class which are strictly public corporations. The latter
might be more properly distinguished as civil or municipad corporations. These are created by the legislature solely for purposes of
local government, such as are incorporated cities, towns or counties. They are depositaries of a portion, of the political power of
the state, which they exercise not as a private franchise but as a
public trust,-as" the mere agents or trustees of the legislature,
subject to its supervision and control. Such a charter is not in
any proper sense a contract inter partes, -within the prohibitory
clause of the Constitution. It is therefore revocable, and is subject to alteration at the pleasure of the legislature, saving any
private rights and interests which may have previously becomo
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vested under the action of the corporate body. But charters
creating what may be termed business corporations possess all the
igredients of contracts. First, there are parties, whose concurrent action is essential to give them force and effect, the governmeit proffering and the corporations accepting the franchise, with
such privileges and conditions as the legislature may see fit to
attach to it. There are also mutual olliqations implicdly assumed
by the parties,-thle governmcnt becoining bound, on the one hand,
for the secure enjoyment by the grantees of the corporate
franchise, according to the terms and conditions of the charter,
and the corporators, on the other hand, undertaking, in consideration of thc privileges bestowed, to exercise them faithfully
f.,r the purposes contemplated in the grant of them. Further, the
Ibnsincss conducted under such charters, quite as much as like
enterprises set on foot by persons unincorporated, is provided for
by private capital invested by the corporators for their individual
profit, and the prolerty held and employed by the cowToration
belongs to the corTorators. The state takes no part in the outlay
or profits of the enterprise, and holds no interest whatever in the
corporate property or effects, except in some special instances in
which the state becomes a stockholder. The corporate franchise
itself, although created by the legislaturei becomes when vested by
due acts of acceptance a species of private property, and is recognised and protected at common law as fully as any other kind of
property. The interest which the public have in the objects and
operations of these business corporations is purely incidental, and
in no degree detracts from the private nature of the corporation
and of its franchises.
The Supreme Court in the Dartmouth College Case, in its most
elaborate examination of this subject, found that at common law
charters of incorporation had always been recognised and treated
as contracts between the crown and the grantees; that it was not
competent, even for royal prerogative, without the consent of the
corporation, to alter or abridge them; that they could be revoked
only in the case of a forfeiture for negligence or abuse of the franchise, judicially ascertained. The court, therefore, considered that
charters were strictly and technically within the language of the
Constitution, since that instrument must be presumed to have employed the term "contract" according to its settled usage at common law. And this construction the court found to be supported
VOL. XXII.-12
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by all the considerations of policy which led to the adoption of the
prohibitory clause; since for no species of legal rights could the
protection of the clause be more important than for those created
by charters, whether we consider the heavy outlays of capital often
made under them, the value of the property acquired, or the public interests not unfrequently involved in their objects and operations. So clearly did the Supreme Court consider all charters
(other than such as are strictly public or municipal) to be within
the prohibitory clause, that in the case cited they extended the
protection of the clause to a charter which was granted, not for private gain or profit, nor for any of the ordinary purposes of trade
or business, but purely for a public charity, i. e. for the christianizing of Indians and the education of youth. For the court considered
that the corporate franchise, for whatever object it might have been
granted, together with the right to exercise it according to the
terms and conditions of the charter, was itself, when once vested,
a legal right, and as such was as well entitled to the protection of
the Constitution and laws as were any of the more tangible species
of private property, for the acquiring or holding of which corporations are ordinarily created.
It need only be further remarked on this point that our
Court of Errors and Appeals has already accepted the ruling
of the Dartmouth College Case as the law of this st-te, and
as it happens, has applied it to the protection of the very corporation now before us. In Bailey v. The Philadelphia, lWilnington and Baltimore Railroad Co., 4 Harr. 389, the charter of
this company was held to be a contract within the prohibitory
clause of the Federal Constitution and an Act of the Legislature
abridging certain corporate privileges under it was on that ground
held to be invalid.
We may next proceed to inquire whether the Act of the General
Assembly under consideration impairs the obligation of the contract contained in the charter of the railroad company. And to
this question also the Dartmouth College Case will be found to
afford a clear and conclusive answer.
The sense of the phrase "impairing the obligation of a contract"
and the precise effect of the constitutional prohibition, will vary
somewhat according to the subject-matter to which it is applied.
In the case of contracts wholly executory, which were doubtless
-those directly contemplated by the Constitution, the operation of
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the clause would be to prohibit any law disclharging or releasing a
party to the contract from the stipulations undertaken to be performed on his part, or modifying such stipulations. It is thus that
a state insolvent law which undertakes to discharge a debt contracted prior to its passag6 comes in conflict with the constitutional
provision. Where the contract is an executed one, as is a grant,
the obligation of it is lheld to be impaired by a law operating to
divest any riglht or estate which has passed or become vested under
the grant. Such was the construction of the phrase under consideration in the celebrated case of Pletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
in which an act of a state legislature, undertaking to re-assume
rights which had vested under a grant made by a prior legislature,
was held to impair the obligation of the contract implied in the
grant. The Dartmouth College Case was the first in which this
plhrase "impairing the obligation of a contract" received a direct
judicial construction as applied to a corporate charter. Such a
charter would seem to be quite clearly within the principle of
Pletcher v. Peek. For, treating a charter simply as a grant or
executed contract., the franchise, which is the subject-matter of the
grant, must be as clearly protected by the Constitution against any
revocation or abridgment of it, as is a title to land which may be
the subject of a legislative grant. But a charter is a contract both
executed and executory; and viewing it in the latter aspect, the
court in the Dartmouth College Case held that in the grant of a
charter there is an implied contract on the part of the government
that the corporators having accepted the franchise, shall, so long as
they exercise their corporate powers faithfully, in accordance with
the ends and purposes of their incorporation, enjoy the franchise
as fully and beneficially as it is granted, without abridgment or
alteration. Hence the court deduced, as the principle of its decision, that a law altering the charter in any of its materialprovisions, without the consent of the corporation, impaired the obligation of the contract. Now, what will or will not amount to
such a material alteration of the charter as to bring a law into
conflict with the constitutional prohibition it may not be easy to
define, but it is sufficient and quite safe to say that an act having
the effect to abridge or restrict any power or privilege vested by
the charter which is material to the beneficial exercise of the franchise granted, and which must be supposed to have entered into
the consideration which induced the corporators to accept the
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charter and to assume the duties imposed by it, is such an alteration as the constitutional provision forbids, and that any act so
operating is invalid.
Let us apply this principle to the case in hand. The objectand effect of the law under consideration is to regulate, and so far
to restrict, the power of the railroad company to charge for the
transportation of passengers and freight. Of such a power it is
hardly enough to say that it is one of value and importance to tlh
company; it is one essential to the enjoyment of the franchise,
and must be presumed to have been the consideration for which the
corporators accepted the charter, invested their money, and assumed the obligations imposed upon them. It was undoubtedly
competent for the legislature, by a provision in the charter, to reserve to itself the right to supervise and regulate in the future
this power of the company ; but, upon a careful examination of
the original acts incorporating the several companies now composing the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, we are unable to find in them any reservation of such legislative control over these companies as is necessary to sustain the
act under consideration. The power to adjust the tariff of charges
by its own officers, according to their views of the necessities of
business and of justice to the public, without supervision, was a
part of the franchise as it was granted. The attempted regulation
by the legislature of this power materially abridges the beneficial
exercise of it by the corporation, and without any doubt impairs
the obligation of the contract in the sense of the Constitution as
interpreted by the Dartmouth College Case. The question is not
admissible in what degree the power of the company to charge is
restricted by the statute, or whether the regulation enacted by it
is or is not a reasonable or proper one. The principle is that any
material modification of the charter, or of the franehise or powers
granted under it, is prohibited by the Constitution. In the Dartmouth College Case the amendment of the charter by the Legislature of New Hampshire appears to have been made in good faith,
with a view to enlarge the sphere and incrlease the usefulness of
that institution. What was before a college only was by the act
converted into a university; the original board of trustees was increased in number, and the general administration of the institution by the trustees was made subject to the supervision of a
Board of- Overseers, who were to be appointed by the Governor
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and Council, and who thus directly represented the state.
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Says

Chief Justice MARSHALL, in' his opinion, after detailing these
changes: "This may be for the advantage of this college in particular, and may be for the advantage of literature in general, but
it is not according to the will of the donors, and is subversive of
that contract on the faith of which their property was given."
Mr. Justice WAsuINGT-so, also, speaking to the same point, says:

"In all r'escects in which the contract has been altered without
the assent of-the corporation its obligations have been impaired,
and the degree can make no difference in the construction of the

above provision of the Constitution."
It may be worth while to notice here, that the operation of the
statute of New Hampshire upon the charter of Dartmouth College,
was essentially similar to the effect of the Act of our General Asse4nbly now under consideration. The governing pover of the
college was by the original charter vested exclusively and without
restriction in the trustees therein appointed and their successors.
By the amendment to the charter this power was subjected to the
supervising control of the state through a board of overseers to be
appointed- by its officers, the Governor and Council; .and thus
what had been under the charter an absolute power of administraton in the corporators was brought under the regulation of the
state. This modification was strongly commented on by the Chief
Justice as the feature of the New Hampshire statute which was
most clearly repugnant to the constitutional prohibition. Precisely
such is the effect of the act before us. It assumes for the state
the right to regulate what under the charter was granted as an absolute discretion in this corporation, viz., the right to adjust its
tariff of charges for the carriage of passengers and freight.
We have attentively considered the arguments urged with much
ingenuity and force by tie learned counsel who maintained the
validity of this act. Among them the argument of greatest force,
and the one most relied on, was an effort to bring the act within
the scope of those legislative powers which are so essential to good
government and the social welfare that they are treated as inalienable; so that one legislature cannot, even by coritract,
abridge the full control of a succeeding legislature over the same
suhject-matter. Such, for example, is the right of the Government at all times to provide for the common defence, to take private property for the public use, to raise revenue, and what is
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termed the police power of the state.

It was the last of these

inalienable powers, viz., that of internal police regulation, to which
the act before us was in the argument sought to be referred. The
importance of the question here raised requires and has received
our serious consideration.
The police power of the state comprehends all those general
laws of internal regulation which are necessary to secure the peace,
good order, health and comfort of society. We are now concerned,
not so much to discuss this power at large as to ascertain, with
sufficient precision for the case before us, what is the proper limit
of the state police power in its bearing upon chartered rights and
privileges, as these are protected by the Constitution of the United
States. It is not difficult to ascertain a rule sufficiently definite to
be readily applied to cases, and one securing all interests involved
-saving to the state, on the one hand, all needful authority for
the legitimate purposes of police regulation, and yet, on the other
hand, not trenching upon the constitutional protection of chartered
rights. Such a rule would seem to be this: that the legislature
may at all times regulate the exercise of the corporate franchise
by general laws passed in good faith for the legitimate ends contemplated by the state police power-that is, for the peace, good
order, health, comfort and welfare of society-but that it cannot,
under color of such laws, destroy or impair the franchise itself nor
any of those rights or powers which are essential to its beneficial
exercise. Thus, acts regulating the mode of carriage of passengers with a view to their safety, or regulating the speed of travel
through towns or cities, or prescribing certain precautions for the
public safety at crossings, or requiring the erection of fences, &c.,
&c., are proper exercises of the power of police regulation. Such
acts leave the franchise unimpaired and simply regulate the exercise of it in some particulars plainly essential to the general safety,
health or comfort of society. But quite different are acts which
directly touch the constitution of the corporation, or abridge or
modify any of those corporate powers which are essential to the
,very ends of its creation ; such powers, for example, as the right
to operate a railroad at all, the right to take tolls, or fares and
freights, or to adjust their tariff of such charges. These are not
police regulations, but are in substance and effect amendments of
the charter; and it is most obvious that if, under color of the police power, corporations may be thus dealt with, the constitutional
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provision, so solemnly adjudged by the Supreme Court to be a
protection to their rights, is, after all, as to them, wholly nugatory.
This view of the limit of the police power, as exercised over
corporations, was taken by the Supreme Court of Vermont in
'Tiorpe v. The Rutland and Burlington railway, 27 Vt. 1410,
cited fully in Redfield on Railways, ch. 81, see. 2, note 1. That
%1$e drew into question the right of the legislature to require
existing railway companies to respond in damages for cattle killed
or injured by their trains until they should erect suitable cattle
guards at farm crossings. The court, in the course of an elaborate
discussion by Chief Justice REDFLD of the general liability of
corporations to legislative control, say: "It must be conceded
that all which goes to the constitution of the corporation and its
beneficial operation is granted by the legislature, and cannot be
revoked, either directly or indirectly, without a violation of the
grant, which is regarded as impairing the contract, and so prohibited by the United States Constitution." Again, they say,
"the privilege of operating the road, or taking tolls or freight and
fare, is the essential franchise conferred. Any act essentially paralyzing this franchise, or destroying the profit therefrom arising,
would no doubt be void. But beyond that the entire power of
legislative control resides in the legislature," &c. And the court
proceeded to sustain the act before them, requiring the erection of
cattle-guards, as an act of police regulation only, such as did not
impair the franchise or any of its essential rights or powers. In
a late treatise on the subject of Constitutional Limitations by
Judge COOLEY, p. 577, upon an extended and very satisfactory
examination of the point now before us, substantially the same
limitation is drawn to the exercise of the police power as affecting
chartered rights. The requisites to the valid exercise of the police
power the author holds to be these: "The regulations must have
reference to the comfort, safety or welfare of society; they must
riot be in conflict with any of the provisions of the charter; and
they must riot, under pretence of regulation, take from the corporation any of the essential rights and privileges which the charter
confers. In short, they must be police regulationsinfact, and not
amendments qf the charter, in curtailment of the corporatefranchise. The maxim, sic utere tuo 2tt alienum non lWas, is that
which lies at the foundation of the power, and to whatever enactment affcctin, the management and business of private corpora-
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tions it cannot fairly be applied, the power itself will not extend.
It has accordingly been held that where a corporation was chartered
with the right to take toll from passengers over their road, a subsequent statute authorizing a certain class of persops to go toil
free was void: Pingrey v. Jlashburne, 1 Aiken 2G8. This was
not a regulation of existing rights, but it took from the corporation
- that which they before possessed, namely, the right to tolls, and
conferred upon individuals that which before they had not, namely,
the privilege to pass over the road free of toll."
The Attorney-General, who appeared on behalf of the state, put
in the strongest possible form the argument in support of this act
as an exercise of internal regulation, by insisting that there must
at all times inhere in the legislature an authority to protect the
public against extortionate charges and unjust discriminations by
carriers exercising a public employment, and that to this power
railroad corporations, as well as other common carriers, must be
held amenable. That the legislature possesses the general power
here claimed for it is not doubted; but the real question still remains, viz.: in what mode may such power be constitutionally
exercised,-at least over corporations? The answer is, that the
legislature may by general laws forbid extortion and unjust discriminations on the part of common carriers, as it may prohibit any
other offence' against social order or the general welfare. It was
not disputed in the argument, that for the breach of such laws, corporations as well as natural persons may be held liable; but such
liability would be enforced by a judicial proceeding, in which the
alleged extortionate or unjustly discriminating character of the
charges drawn into the question would be judicially ascertained.
Such remedies against common carriers already exist at the common law, and to these, as well as to the common-law liabilities of
common carriers generally, incorporated carriers as well as natural
persons are subject by the public nature of their employment:
Very different, however, from such a mode of regulation by general
laws, with a liability to judicial remedies, is the attempt by a legislature .to prescribe in advance a tariff of charges for carriers,-to
do which is in effect to take out of their hands the management of
their own business. This certainly cannot be done in the case of a
corporation. How far the legislature can directly regulate charges
by common carriers not incorporated isa question not now arising;
but the right of a corporation to conduct its own business-to
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aljust its tariff' of charges (subject to the implied condition that
such charges shall not be unreasonable) stands upon a special
ground not applicable to an unincorporated carrier. For such
uight, being a part of the corpormte franchise granted by charter,
is protected by the Constitution of the United States. And this
brings the case back to the view before presented as to the true
limitation of the police power over corporations. It is the only
view by which both the general power of police regulation by the
state over corporations and their due protection under the Constitution ('an be preserved and kept in harmony.
Enough has been said to show to what conclusion the court is
impelled. We are of opinion that, inasmuch as the act under consideration assumes the absolute power to regulate and control the
exercise of a corporate right which was granted to this company as
-t part ,,f its franchise, without any reserved power of such future
regulation by the legislature, it is not a legitimate exercise of the
state police power, but is in substance and effect an alteration of
the charter, and materially impairs the obligation of the contract
in the sense of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. The Constitution, so interpreted, is the supreme
law of the land, and we have no alternative but to apply it to the
case before us. A contrary judgment of this court would be pr'acticahly an attempt to subvert the Constitution of the United States
within this state.
Let a certificate answering the questions reserved be drawn in
accordance with this opinion.
The Chief Justice and Associate Justices expressed their concurrence in the opinion delivered by the Chancellor.
The attempt of the statute in question seems to have been to compel the
railway companies doing business within
the state to charge no higher fare or
freight for the traffic within the state
than they did for that which passed
through the state or out of it upon the
same railways. There is one objection
against this mode of regulating the fares
and freights of railways within the state
by those of the same companies without
the state which does not seem to have
been considered by the court, if, indeed, it were urged by counsel, viz.:

that the states have no power to regulate
fares and freights taken by their own
railways beyond the limits of the state,
or for traffic which passes through the
state, or across ihe line of the state,
whether going into or out of the state,
this matter pertaining exclusively to
Congress under the reservation in the
United States Constitution for Congress
to have the exclusive power "to regulate commerce among the several states."
This question we have discussed elsewhere : Ante, p. 1. The attempt, therefore, to measure the duty of a railway
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company within the state by its duty and
practice without the state, would seem to
be adopting a measure altogether foreign
to the subject; as much so as requiring
the companies within the state to conform to the same rules in that respect
a
foreign railway companies did.
There is another fatal objection to the
vdidity of the plaintiff's claim, inasmuch as a portion of the alleged overcharge in both actions was for transportation across the line of the state, which
the state legislature had no power to
regulate, that belonging exclusively to
Congress, under the power of regulating
all inter state commerce, so that unquestionably the court might, upon this
ground alone, have decided the cases
against the plaintiff as they did.
But the ground upon which tile decision
is placed by the court, seems to us untenable. The doctrine assumed by the
court is, that the power to adjust its
tariff of charges by its own officers, according to their views of the necessities of business and of justice to
the public, without supervision, was a
part of tHe franchise, as it was granted
to the company, and "the attempted regulation by the legislature of this power
materially abridges the beneficial exercise of it by the corporation, and M'ithout
any doubt impairs the obligations of the
contractin the sense of the Constitution
as interpreted by the Dartmouth College
Oise." The only authorities cited hy
the court in favor of this somewlat
startling proposition are two cases from
Vermont, in one of which the legislature, after granting a turnpike company,
to le maintained by certain tolls, paya.
hie Iy all persons passing the company's
gates with teams or carriages, passed a
subsequent act, allowing certain classes
of persons to use the road without paying tolls, thus claiming a power which,
if conceded, would extend to all persons, and thus destroy the entire franchise, which the court of course held
void. There would seem no analogy

between a statute depriving the company of all toll and one merely regulating its tolls, and so the same court
held in State v. .Bosworth, 13 Vermt.
402. The other case cited was decided
in favor of thIe validity of the statute, as
being only a legitimate exercise of legislation, and was supported by such an
argument as we, at the time, supposed
every one would understand as most unequivocally opposed to the view maintained in the principal case, and which,
so far as we know, has always been so
received. In regard to the present question we may be allowed in self-vindication to repeat what we then said:
" While it is conceded the legislature
could not prohibit existing railways fron
carrying freight or passengers, it is bLelieved tlat, beyond all question, it may so
regulate these matters as to impose stew
obligations and restrictions upon these
roads, materially affecting their profits."
The learned judge in the principal case
also refers to Judge CooLEY's work on
"Constitutional Limitations," and to our
own work on "Railways," chap. 32,
see. 2, n. 1, where we had uscd this
language: "Corporations, like natural
persons, are subject to remedial legislation, ant amenable to general laws,"
which we had always supposed would
embrace the reasonable regulation of
fares and freights to be charged lv common carriers by whatever mode of transportation. We certainly should not
have alluded to our own views upon
this question at any former period had
they not been cited in support of opinions
directly in conflict with those we have
always attempted to defehd, and which
we believe to he of vital importance to
the quiet and good order of society in
some of the most important usiness
relations. Jtdgc CooLov'sbbook we liNd
always understood and esteemed as the
great bulwark in our country against the
construction (if the Darmnulh CUrge
Case ill the nian-r it is upplied in the
principal case.
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We must say, in all soberness, that if
the doctrine of the Dartmouth College
Case reached so far into the domain of
state legislation as to exempt corporatons friom its control except when
favorable to their vi ihes, which is no
control at nil, we should le prepared to
say it never ought to i:ave bent made,
and the sooner it is rcvered the better.
But there is, in our humble judgment,
no fair pretence for giving it any such
extension. By conmon consent it is
conceded that tile New llampshire legislature had in effect repealed tle charter
of Dartmouth College, anti substituted a
new college or university in its place, and
the'e separate institutions continued in
oellration until the decision wits declared
by ihe court. We cannot suppose, from
the doctrines contained in the opinion
in that case, that there was any purpose
or exempting existing corporations from
the florte of general legislation, to any
greater extent than natural persons are
exeptllpe.l.
State legislatures have no power to
tranl-fr the property of one person,
natural or corporate, to another, or to
deirive the owner of its beneicial use :
and it is this principle which lies at tile
fbltlaton of the decision in that case.
l'h franchises of a corporation to act as
!-uch, and to pursue the Iusiness implied
in its creation, are its property, as much
a,;
its goods anti chattels, anti it matters

placing them upon the same level as
natural persons pursuing the same business, under tile same legislative guar-

aitee.
The luere grant to be a corporation,
and to pursue the business of a common
carrier. implies nothing more than every
natural person already possesses the right
and power to become a common carrier.

If the legislature grant the exclusivepri-

vilegeof'carryingon the business between
certain points, whether to a corporation,
or to a natural person, it becomes an
irrevocable grant ; but without such an
express ant exclusive grant, no such
right can be implied in favor of a corporation, any more than of a natural
person.
The same is true of the right
to regulate rates of toll, or fares and
freights, upon the route. It must be
done by the carrier, unless, and until,
tile state see fit to asslime tile control of
it. But no such1 excltsive rigtt of reglation will le implied, in favor of a corporation, any ulore than of a natural
person, because there was no general
law in force upon the subject, when tile
buqiness was entered upon.
The implication in both cases should
he against all exclusive privileges, unless
shown by express grant. The corporation, like a natural person, enters upon
its business suiject to future legislative
control. This is ahundantly shown by
numerous decisions of the national Sitlittle whether the legislature repeal those preme Court: Clarles Ri'er Bridtqe v.
franchises, or paralyze their use, by ar- lWarren Bridge, 11 'et. U. S. 420 ; Richitrary and needless restrictions. It is mand P. 4- P. Ryt. v. Louisa !., 13
agllilst this kind of legislative inter- Irow. U. S. 71 ; Turnpike Co. v. State,
I rLcrnce that the decision in tile Dart- 3 Wall. 210. The decisions of the state
moath College Case is levelled. But courts adopt the same views of course :
there is nothing in that case, which, upon Boston 4 Lowell ltj. v. Salem 4- Lowell
any fair construction, can be understood Ry , 2 Gray I ; Pontrl artrainRy. v. N.
as giving any greater immunity to corpo- Orleans, Car. 4. Lake P. Riy., 11 La.
raLtions, froin obeying general legislation

Ann. 253.
Weshall now, as briefly as practicable,
persons have. That deciion is audre.sed, refler to the decisions upon analogous
mainly, to the point of declaring invio- questions where the statutes have been
late, tile vital or essential franchises and upielt affcting the business anti interlunctions of existing corporations ; thus ests of existing corporations. In an

in regard to their business, tilan natural
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opinion of the justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, on the
question of the validity of an act of the
legislature, regulating the investments
of deposits in savings banks. as to existing corporations, 12 Cash. 604, Chief
Justice SHAW uses the following language: " The snperintending power or
the legislature applies. not only to individuals or natural persons, but with
equal propriety to'artificial persons, or
corporatious, except so isr as these persons are exempted from the operation
of this power, by the provi.-ions of their
charters."
* * "Incidental or implied
powers, upon just principles of construction, can be made to embrace, at most,
only such powers as are essentially necessary to enable the corporation to accomplish the purposes of its creation."
* * "No
special power or privilege
being given in the charter, as to the
mode of conducting its business, the
corporation arranged 'all its afftirs, according to the general laws. It took
its charter, subject to the general laws,
and of course subject to such changes
as might be rightfully made in such
laws. The legislature surely did not
guarantee to the corporation that there
should be no change in the laws; that
the whole system of legislation should
remain as it was " at the date of the
charter. "The corporation at the time
it was incorporated, had the right and
power, under the general laws, to loan
money at six per cent. interest, but
there can be no doubt the legislature
could alter the law, so that the institution could take only four or five per
cent. interest.
The corporation had
power under its charter to hold and dispose of property, hut there was nothing
in the charter, as to the mode, and of
course the property could be held and
disposed of only, according to the
general laws, which the legislature
might, at any time, alter, and the corporation would be bound by the alteration." The language of such a judge,

upon a question with whichi he was st,
long familiar, ought sur!.v o b)e of
great weiglht; aid it seems to us to

cover the whole ground of the principal
case.
The regulation of the charges, and of
the mode of conducting the business of
common carriers of passengers and
freight, is surely one for legislatire nction more than most others; and especially since the construction of railways,
whereby all regulation of prices, by way
of competition, upon most routes, ha.s
been rendered impossible, thus making it
a most overwhelming monopoly, extending to the most important nti (-sentinl
interests of the whole community. But
there are many other eases taking slt
same ground in regard to the power of
the legislature to regulate the business
of corporations the same as that of natisral persons. In Brannin v. Conn. ." P.
RY., 31 Vt. 214, the court held that a
statute making the corporation liable for
the wages of laborers employed upon
the construction of their road, by the
contractors, was valid. ALDIS, J., said:
"The power of the legislature to pass
all laws required by the public welfare,
and to subject corporations, like natural
persons, to their operation, is most unquestionable."
The same principle is
maintained in Peters Y. St. Louis Iron
Mountain Ry., 23 Mo. 107. And the
general proposition that corporations are
as much subject to the general laws of
the state, regulating their business, as
natural persons engaged in the same business, unless specially exempted by charter, is declared in numerous othercases
State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189 , Galena 4Chicago Ry.
. Loomis, 13 Ill. 548;
ComnmercialBank of Jtnchesterv.
,idn.
7 How. (Miss.) 508; Grand GulfBanA
v. Archer, 8 Sm. & M. 151.
A statute
forbidding bequests to corporations is
valid, as to existing corporations : Ayres
V. MethodistEpiscopal Ch., 3 Sanf. 351.
So a general statute making railway
companies responsible for all losses
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caued by fires communicated by ther
engines, without regard to the question
of negligence, was hell valid, as to existing companies : Lqinin v. Boston 6"
|l'orc. Ry., 4 Cush. 288 ; .T. P. Norris
v. Androscoggin Ry., 39 Me. 273. So
too of laws requiring railways to fence
. 26
their roads : (Yormun v. Parific
Ao. 441 ; Nelson v. i. 6. Canai RlI.,
26 Vt. 717. The decisions of the state
courts, where general laws imposing
new burdens upon or restricting the
mode of exercising existing powers by
corporations have been upheld, are very
numerous, ani almost all one way.
But it seems to be su~pposed that fare
and freight to a railway company is
something specially sacred, as if it were
more vital to the corporation than interest to a hank, or the right of natural
persons to conduct their business in their
own way. freed from nil future legislative control. But the right of taking
fare and freight, by railway companies,
is not in any instance an arbitrary and
unlimited right or power. At common
law its exercise is required to be reasonable and just, and in proportion to the
service, "and not to exact what lie
will :" LAWRT'NCE, J., in tHarris v.
Puckwaod, 3 Taunt. 264 ; Mew England
F.xprss Co v. M[aine Cent. Ay., 57 le.
188 ; a. c., 9 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 728
and notes: AfcDcffee v. P. 6- It. Ri., 52
N. 11. 430, and cases cited in opinion.
The chartering of a railway to become a
common carrier clearly implies nothing
more than that it may do as other common carriers are allowed by law to do,
take reasonable compensation for its
service. The idea that such a company
is so far above the control of the legislature that it will not lie hound by a
general law applicable to all common
carriers or to all railways, intending to
establish uniform rates of charge to all
who employ them, seems to us to admit
of no fair argument in its support, either
from principlc or authority.

In saying this we disclaim all purpose
of intiroating any doubt in regard to the
fairness of the argument of the court in
favor of the conclusion to which they
came, since none is attempted by them.
It seems to be assumed by the court, as
an axiomatic proposition, that if an nit
denying the company all compensation
for their services coull lie void, under
the United States Constitution, which no
one will deny, it muit be equally beyond
the power of the legislature to pass an
act in any way interfering with tIme entire freedom of the company, to demand
and receive fire and freight, without
limit or restraint, except from their own
sense of justice or policy. This is what
the language we have extracted from
We
the opinion, in terms declares.
trust we have sufficiently pointed out the
difference between the regulation and
the denial of fare and freight, as to existing carriers, whether natural or corporate persons.
The United States Supreme Court,
whose decisions are final upon this question, does not seem to have made any
expressly upon the particular point in
question ; but there are some bearing
upon it, more or less, to which we will
briefly refer. In Bank- of Columbia v.
Okelg, 4 Wheaton 235, it was held
that a special provision in a state bank
charter, giving the corporation a summary process against its debtors, is no
part of its corporate franchises, and may
he repealed at the will of the legislature.
So too in Providence Bank v. Boslings,
4 Pet. U. S. 514, it was held that a state
law, taxing the capital stock of a bank.
does not impair the obligatioi of the
contract, arising from its charter, which
contains no stipulation on the subject of taxation. So too the legislature of the
state, having authorized a turnpike company to raise money iy a lottery, a subsequent act, limiting the time for the
exercise of such authority, is valid :
Phalen v. Tiryinia, & How. U. S. 163.
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The decisions of this court are almost
uniform in favor of the views for which
we contend. The only decision which
gives the slightest color to the doctrine
of the principal case is that of The BingAamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51, where three
of the judges dissented ; and the implications which some have thought to be
necessary results of that decision, viz. :
that corporations took exclusive rights
and privileges, above the control of the
legislature, without express grant or clear
implication, have not been maintained
in the subsequent decisions of the court:
Turnpike Co. v. State of M1aryland, 3
Wall. 210.
We have thus attempted to present
fairly and fully what we regard as the
true rule upon this vital question of conVc have no purpose of
stitutional law.
impugning either the wisdom or learning of the court making the decision in
the principal case. We accord them the
highest measure of both, as every one
must who remembers .the high standing
of that court for the last half century.
And we cannot disguise to ourselves,
and have no wish to evade or suppress
the admission of the existence of a very
extensive public opinion, possibly to
some extent among the profession, if
not among judges, both state and national, without much reflection orexamination, that the Dartmnouth College
Case really does justify some such doctrine as that contained in the principal
case. This view is somewhat purposely
countenanced often, it is feared, by two
classes of people: 1. Those who feel no
respect for any doctrine of law whereby

vested rights are held inviolate, and who
consequently desire to bring all such
rules of law, as far as practicable, into
public disrespect and contempt, which,
in a free country, largely governed by
popular impulses and opinions, is in no
way more successfully promoted than by
pushing all such doctrines to the greatest
extreme, so as to defeat their force and
operation, as far as possihle, bv the reductio ad ab,urd n,. 2. There are a very
numerous and influential class of people,
the controllers of vast amounts of capital, variously invested in associate and
corporate stocks, who, in all good faith
and soberness, use every means in their
power to convince themselves and others
tlt capital demanmls the inviolable protection of all the powers both of legislation and of judicial administration, and
that to this end it is desirable to maintain
the doctrine that corporations, when
once chartered, are above the control of
all legislation, except such as may be
solicited by such corporations for their
own advantage. But we trust we have
shown that neither class obtain any
countenance from the doctrines of the
Dartmouth oUllege Case, when properly
understood. No one can honestly believe, we think, that if the New Ilampshire legislature had only passed a general law, requiring all colleges nnd private schools to charge uniform rates of
tuition to all students in the same
classes, that time act would have been
held void. But that is all which the
statute involved in the principal case
I. F. R.
attempted.

